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The Postwar and the Proto-Postmodern 
 
Here, at least, I could try to think things out in peace, or, if not in peace, in 
quiet. I would take up residence underground. The end was in the beginning. 
      —Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man 
 While the meaning of Ralph Ellison’s concluding remark to his 1952 novel leaves a sort 
of Gordian knot for readers to untangle, the text clarifies at least one point: “here” is 
underground, a sanctuary for the narrator as he retreats from a society that renders him invisible. 
Like the entirety of the novel, though, the who—the “human” identity—that takes refuge remains 
indeterminable, since the narratives of the past—whether Booker T. Washington’s or W.E.B Du 
Bois’s ideals of racial uplift, trade unionism or bootstrap individualism, or, ultimately, racial 
Nationalism or Marxism—continually name and rename the invisible man’s identity, offering 
him a place in the chain of history(s) they say will guarantee emancipation. By staging the novel 
as a frustrated search for visibility and recognition within these histories that constantly leave the 
“I” in flux, Ellison’s account of “invisibility” not only serves as an aesthetic expression of Du 
Bois’s “double consciousness,” but it also provides a term to make the erasure of his dignity 
intelligible. To cope with this revelation, the “invisible man” thus takes sanctuary to think and 
sort out the question, “And what shall I do now?” 
 Like the “invisible man” of Ellison’s novel, Western civilization after World War II 
undergoes a process of reevaluation that is essentially ethical and political in character, prompted 
by the crises of systemic violence. After the horrors of the Nazi regime, whether its external 
pursuit of European conquest through warfare or the Holocaust, modernity’s ethical framework 
of Humanism—”the philosophical champion of human freedom and dignity” that “assumes an 
unchanging, wholly self-aware [and rational] subject unaffected by exterior forces”—and its 
narrative of Progress and human perfectibility (both “metanarratives”) ring hollow because of 
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their complicity with genocide (Davies 5; Holland 4-5). With Nazism’s racial narrative of Aryan 
supremacy driving and legitimating a systematized form of violence, Humanism’s central 
concept of “humanity” begins to unravel because of totalitarianism’s ability to conduct such 
mass degradation of human dignity while espousing the humanist ideal of rationality. Put more 
succinctly, Tony Davies writes in Humanism that “[i]n the face of [systematized violence] … not 
only humanism … but the very notion of the human was called to account” (51). Similar ethical 
questions are raised surrounding Harry S. Truman’s decision to annihilate two Japanese cities 
with products of state-sponsored science, introducing the world into the atomic age and setting 
the stage for a geopolitical standoff between Capitalism and Communism that will define the 
remainder of the century.  
Out of this destruction, the Allied victory, and the introduction of the atomic bomb, a new 
political paradigm emerges where a dualistic balance of power between the United States and the 
USSR dominates. As Jeffrey Nealon suggests in Post-Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic of 
Just-in-Time Capitalism, this global context shapes and defines the theories and theorists that 
will later be labelled “postmodern.”
1
 Postmodern thought, as Nealon sees it, is defined by its 
attempt “to find a kind of ‘third way’” between the positions presented by “American 
consumerism on one side and Russian communism on the other,” and from this search for a third 
form of engagement with the world, he claims an underlying “open/closed” binary emerges in 
postmodernism (120). For postmodern thinkers, political choices and allegiances coincide either 
with “openness and possibility” or “rigid, inflexible, univocal standard[s] of value or right,” and 
the postmodern perspective identifies the either/or of Capitalism versus Communism, of liberal 
versus social humanisms, with such univocality (120–1).
2
 Such a conception of the world 
prompts a departure from the humanisms, shifting toward an epistemology based on the 
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indeterminacy of knowledge, language, and their relationship to authority in order to reevaluate 
modern ethical thought.  
While this ethical aim runs contrary to the “advoca[cy] … [of] moral nihilism” that A.T. 
Nuyen describes as the preliminary understanding of postmodernism (“Normative Question” 
411), postmodern thought advocates decoupling ethics from modern concepts of “humanity” and 
the metanarratives modern humanists use to legitimate their claims because, according to 
postmodernists, such constructions ultimately service hierarchical social relations. In terms of 
Nealon’s binary, then, “openness” represents a “linguistic turn” toward what critics such as 
Davies call philosophical “anti-humanism,” while modern humanism occupies the “closed” 
position of totality and universality because of its assuredness of the immutability of . Although, 
as Alan Schrift claims in Twentieth-Century French Philosophy, the theories of Michel Foucault, 
one of the prominent intellectual figures in the postmodern reevaluation of modern ethics, are 
“less an anti-humanism than an attempt to think humanism and the subject after the end of 
(modern) man” (63). “Far from being a thinker of ‘the death of the subject,” Schrift argues, 
“Foucault simply refuses to accept the subject as given, as the foundation for ethical and rational 
thinking” (63). Apart from the modern view, Foucault views a matrix of knowledge and power 
structures, constructed through language, as the “ethical center” rather than the individual (or 
subject). While concerned with the human subject like the moderns and not completely “anti-
humanist,” postmodern theory’s emphasis on the subject’s constructedness and the privileging of 
structures in the formation of ethical thought still demarcates a dividing line between 
modernity’s “ethics of the individual” and postmodernity’s “ethics of the structure.” 
When we return to the cultural and intellectual climate of the post-war and early 
postmodern period, however, theories and literatures of the time complicate such a clean binary. 
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If we accept Jean-François Lyotard’s claim in The Postmodern Condition that postmodernity is 
marked by an “incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv), works by Hannah Arendt, Albert 
Camus, Ralph Ellison, Joseph Heller, and Kurt Vonnegut also reside in the period we have come 
to understand as “the postmodern” because of their critical engagement with the ideological 
constructs fueling the engines of the Cold War, carving out a period in late modernity I am 
calling the “proto-postmodern.” Unlike Lyotard and poststructuralists such as Jacques Derrida 
and Michel Foucault, these writers remain invested in the modern humanistic concepts of ethics 
and human dignity yet simultaneously struggle with the violence modernity produces in its 
political and social organizations, thereby blurring the open/closed binary of political and ethical 
commitment. Caught between modernity’s introduction (the ethical ideals of uplifting the human 
community out of authoritarian structures) and its conclusion (the dehumanization of entire 
populations caused by intensified forms of modern ethical thought), they search for ways to 
salvage humanist values and reorient modernity’s ethical code as society departs from the post-
war and enters the Cold War, but without falling back into the same authoritative totalizations 
typical of modernity. Although, as Ellison’s closing line to Invisible Man reminds us, the proto-
postmodern attempt to revitalize aspects of humanism, when faced with its violent consequences, 
leads into a cycle of despairing yet hopeful contemplation both of the past and present. 
In order to explore the Sisyphean nature of the pursuit to rethink humanism without 
discarding it, my essay first discusses the modern/postmodern binary as framed in the terms of 
humanism and anti-humanism, respectively, which emphasizes the hybridity of proto-
postmodernism and the possibilities that it opens for reevaluating modern ethics from an ethical 
and committed standpoint. Although the term “anti-humanist” prevails in criticism surrounding 
the differences of the modern and postmodern, I propose that the student rebellions of 1968 
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demonstrate the inapplicability of this term when we consider the intersection of Ihab Hassan’s 
belief that the events of 1968 were the beginnings of the postmodern spirit and the students’ 
hybrid stance on humanism. Rather, these events express a “counter-humanism” that desires a 
(post)modern humanism and underscores the political commitment of proto-postmodernism: in 
other words, a “humanistic counter-humanism” still explicitly concerned with the value of 
dignity as well as ethical and political questions. After surveying 1968, I examine the periodizing 
work of literary and cultural critics such as Fredric Jameson, Linda Hutcheon, Robert Genter, 
Andreas Huyssen, and Tony Davies to situate the proto-postmodern writers in terms of 
modern/postmodern ethical and political commitments. Against this critical backdrop, proto-
postmodernism represents an in-between of the (postmodern) questioning and the (modern) 
committed stances because it interrogates how modern humanism’s ethics spawned its opposite 
(anti-humanism), yet also attempts to reforge ethics in light of postwar crises as one of its central 
tasks. Because of their specific concern with violence, the proto-postmoderns resist a retreat into 
the reductionist casting of humanity in the “linguistic turn” that the postmoderns express in their 
theory and fiction, but they criticize the unfettered belief in the modern idea of progress and self-
centric ethical thought as well. 
Following this section, I detail the counter-humanist side of proto-postmodern texts as 
they write and theorize delegitimation on an ethical and political level and redefine “anti-
humanism” in connection with the metanarratives of modern humanism. Beginning with an 
exploration of the famous quarrel between Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus to further our 
understanding of the French political context out of which poststructuralism arose, this section 
on the proto-postmodern resistance to anti-humanism uses Lyotard’s definitions of 
metanarratives and his theory on its legitimating function to introduce Hannah Arendt’s and 
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Albert Camus’s understanding of totalitarianism and its connection to modern humanism’s 
metanarratives. Providing a complementary reading of this “post” of the postmodern by 
explicating the link between metanarratives and the legitimation violence, Arendt and Camus’s 
ethico-political incredulity toward totalitarianism illustrates the destructive capacities of modern 
humanism’s totalizing ethics, which attempts to enforce through terror an abstract logic—or 
metanarrative—despite the chaotic world of human spontaneity that guarantees human dignity. 
Through Arendt’s theory, I draw connections between totalitarian logicality, ideology, and 
systematic violence, exposing modern humanism’s complicity in violence through its 
metanarratives and its fundamentally anti-humanist character. In the latter part of this section, 
Camus’s deconstruction of Marxism in The Rebel connects its metanarrative to the metanarrative 
of capitalism, which explicates how “progress” in terms of capitalist techno-science plays a 
fundamental role in Marxism’s thought and the violence of Stalinism. Interspersed in the 
discussion of these theories, Ellison’s Invisible Man and Vonnegut’s Cat’s Cradle supplement 
the theories of Arendt and Camus with metaphorical examples of these modern forces at work, 
performing similar political deconstructions as Arendt and Camus in their fiction.  
After defining the contours of modern humanism’s anti-humanism through the 
connection between metanarratives and totalitarianism, the final section interprets the humanistic 
rebellions against American forms of anti-humanism Ellison, Vonnegut, and Heller conduct in 
their literature. Forefronting their novels with a negation of violence and the sacrifice of dignity 
in these modern ethical frameworks, the proto-postmodern novelists also affirm the necessity of 
ethical thought because of its role in preserving human dignity. Using Camus’s concept of the 
absurd “gap” as a theoretical tool, I examine how these proto-postmodern novelists use absurdity 
to expose the divide between American humanism’s claims to enrich collective human dignity 
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and the violence it produces in the world. Afterward, Arendt’s concepts of the “two-in-one” and 
“representative thought” provide a framework for interpreting the ethical, humanistic drive 
underlying each novel, particularly in Vonnegut’s representation of the Hoenikker family in 
Cat’s Cradle and the concept of “invisibility” in Invisible Man. With their representations of 
unthinking characters, Vonnegut and Ellison draw the parallels between thinking, judging, and 
action and the role the lack of conscientious and representative thought plays in abetting violence 
and degrading human worth. In the last part of this section, I apply the established Arendtian 
framework to explore the narrative monologue of Jean-Baptiste Clamence in Camus’s The Fall 
in order to interpret key thematic elements in Heller’s Catch-22, such as the mental binding of 
the monologic narrative form and the blurring of traditional concepts of judgment such as “guilt” 
and “innocence.” 
With World War II bringing the consequences of modern humanism’s metanarratives to 
their logical extreme, manifested in totalitarianism and the Cold War either/or, proto-postmodern 
theory and fiction expose the cracks within the logicality of modern humanism by using 
humanist ethics to untangle the legitimacy of metanarratives and the violence they cause. 
Conducting their interrogation in this way, by folding modernity back upon itself, the proto-
postmoderns thus rebel, in Camus’s sense of the term, against political modernity and its ethics, 
whose legitimating rationales promise emancipation and dignity yet only guarantee death and 
degradation. Using fiction as a means to explore the reasons we ought to compel ourselves into 
thought and, therefore, revitalize our faculty of judgment, the proto-postmodern novelists look to 
reassert the humanistic value of dignity that does not reproduce the binding and logical elements 
of the metanarrative form of legitimation, demonstrating that a dismissal of modern humanism 
does not necessitate a disavowal of ethics or values. Ultimately, the efforts of the proto-
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postmodernists suggest that the novel—as a communicative and representative medium of 
human plurality—has the capacity to construct a new ethical framework for the postmodern era. 
Because of the recent turn toward humanism in contemporary literature and theory, which Mary 
K. Holland details in Succeeding Postmodernism: Language and Humanism in Contemporary 
American Literature, Arendt, Camus, Ellison, Heller, and Vonnegut hold a revived critical and 
cultural importance as foundational figures for contemporary writers and theorists who want to 




Complications in the Modern/Postmodern Binary: 
 Situating the Commitments of 1968 and Proto-Postmodernism 
 
Even more surprising in this odd loyalty to the past is the New Left’s 
seemingly unawareness of the extent to which the moral character of the 
rebellion—now a widely accepted fact—clashes with its Marxian rhetoric. 
—Hannah Arendt, On Violence 
 Despite the postmodern position that typically holds a deeply ingrained suspicion toward 
humanism, Hannah Arendt’s observation in her 1969 essay On Violence of the global student 
rebellions, particularly the New Left movement in the United States, complicates the neat 
periodizing of postmodernism as an outright rejection of modern humanism. The postmodern 
dismissal of modern humanism, as Geoffrey Harpham intimates in “Ethics,” comes from 
theoretical discourse: “[A]ll the leading voices of the Theoretical Era [1968–87] … organized 
their critiques of humanism as exposés of ethics…” (388). Harpham’s periodizing of this era, 
where theory tackles humanism through unraveling its ethics, raises an interesting intersection 
between what Arendt sees as humanism in the streets and what Harpham sees as anti-humanism 
in the academy, which includes postmodern theorists such as Jameson, Irigaray, and Derrida. 
Problematizing the contours of the postmodern further, Ihab Hassan writes in his concluding 
essay of The Postmodern Turn that the migratory course of the term “postmodernism” from 
American to European discourse suggests “the energizing matrix of postmodernism, if not its 
origin, may have been the sixties in America, with all their liberationist and countercultural 
tendencies” (215).
3
 If we accept Hassan’s assessment of the originary role the sixties play in the 
postmodern, then a humanist stance marks the beginning of the postmodern era, yet anti-
humanism marks its theoretical position both concomitantly with the student rebellions of 1968 
and in its aftermath. Thus, the multiplicity of stances on the “humanism question” problematizes 
our concept of the dawn of postmodernity and the twilight of modernity. This contradiction in 
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postmodern genealogy demands a rethinking of the way the events of 1968, the thought 
influencing it, and the thought coming afterward are situated. Staging the humanism/anti-
humanism binary through the theoretical valencies of 1968 illustrates the complications the 
periodizing framework of the modern/postmodern presents along ethical lines of thought. 
Arendt’s analysis of the New Left and the global instances of rebellion offers a 
preliminary understanding of the contradictory elements of 1968 that confuse, muddle, and resist 
categorization. According to Arendt, the students’ “claim for ‘participatory democracy’”—while 
“constitut[ing] the most significant common denominator of the rebellions in the East and the 
West”—runs contrary to the ultimate aim of Marxist ideology, which seeks to wither away “the 
need for public action and participation in public affairs” (Violence 22). Again, like their 
moralistic and humanistic stance, the students espouse Marxist theory yet diverge from it in 
practice. As Ronald Fraser notes in 1968, however, “Marx’s early writings … were [an] 
important source of inspiration for many students” during the years leading up to 1968 (82). 
Thus, the locus of the divorce between Marxist philosophy and the students ideals resides not in 
a misinterpretation, as Arendt wants to suggest, but instead in the trajectory of Marx’s thought. 
While outlining Louis Athusser’s “assault … on Marxist or socialist humanism,” Davies writes 
that “the young Marx parted company with … humanistic premises and pieties [such as notions 
of will, freedom or human potential]” and instead “formulated a model of history and society 
based … on such ‘structural’ concepts as class, ideology, and the forces and relations of 
production” (57-8). The students, then, influenced by Marx’s humanism during their 
development divert from the structuralist Marx, whose thought only enters their rhetoric as 
antagonisms intensified.
4
 The contradictions within the student movement between its cause and 
its theory thus arise from the complexities and unresolved strains of Marxism because it can be 
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divided against itself, and observers such as Arendt exacerbate these contradictions when they 
attempt to force coherence between Marx’s structural and humanist conclusions, both of which 
operate on fundamentally different premises and areas of analysis. 
Analogous to the confusing variance between Marxist humanist and structural philosophy 
in the student movements, their moralistic and political stance co-mingles enlightenment (or 
bourgeois) and socialist humanisms. As Arendt adds to her analysis in On Violence, the students’ 
cause of participatory democracy embodies “the best in the revolutionary tradition—the council 
system, the always defeated but only authentic outgrowth of every revolution since the 
eighteenth century” (22). Analyzing the correlations between participatory democracy, 
anarchism, and social movements, Shmuel Lederman in “Councils and Revolution” typifies 
Arendt’s concept of revolutionary councils as “spontaneous associations of citizens … through 
which they will be able to take part in determining the fate of their body politic and ‘govern 
themselves’” (248). The language of spontaneity and self-governance resonates with the liberal 
humanism of John Stuart Mill: mixing the idea of “liberty” with spontaneous action, 
participatory democracy relies on a universal and essential “Man” that legitimates the  
“revolutionary discourse of rights,” initiated by Rousseau and Paine, while simultaneously 
staging a “‘romantic’ and anti-rationalist … revolt against the chilly despotism of enlightened 
reason…” (Davies 26, 40).  
The movements take the notion of romantic spontaneity further than Mill’s humanism, 
extending the revolt against reason to Western capitalism and its humanist claims. In “The 
Revolutionary Romanticism of May 1968,” Michael Löwry defines the spirit of the student 
rebellions as a “revolutionary romanticism, [which] protest[s] against the foundations of the 
modern industrial/capitalist civilization, its productivism and its consumerism” (950). 
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“[R]ebell[ing] … in the name of past or premodern social and cultural values … against … the 
triumph of mechanization, mercantilization, reification, quantification,” the students take a 
fundamentally anti-capitalist stance according to Löwry (95). Like the major from Minnesota in 
Heller’s Catch-22, the students incredulously demand the Milo Minderbinders of capitalism to 
give society its share and take to the streets because they realize society has only received a 
disdainful IOU on a “scrap of paper” (378). So while the students’ common platform of 
participatory democracy reflects an enlightenment humanism, socialist values and socialist 
critiques permeate their philosophical foundation alongside their humanistic ethical vision. This 
vision subsumes the traditional concept of “liberty” in the liberal humanist tradition, which Mill 
and other political thinkers saw as “guaranteed by reason and natural law” (Davies 40). Instead, 
the students insist on an ideal of human dignity centered on its political, social, and economic 
subjectivity rather than its rationality and notions of natural law. Echoing Marx, they advocate 
for a humanism vying for “the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, 
being” (qtd. in Davies 12), because they base their values on a “concept of socialist freedom … 
consisting not only in the social reappropriation of the economy but in the individual’s power of 
decision over his or her own life as well as that of society…” (Fraser 82). The guarantee of the 
students’ concept of freedom is the very spontaneity that operates as an antithetical strain in 
liberal humanist thought, which places human rationality in tension with its anti-rational reality. 
Instead of employing transcendental laws of nature and the solitude of rationality to construct 
their ideals, the students of 1968 privilege the irrational and spontaneous aspects of human 
sociality as the guarantor of freedom and dignity. In other words, political and social existence, 
or the interaction in the public realm where the self is constantly subject to the other yet still 
validated through expression, defines the “human.” 
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In this view, where the student rebellions act as a cultural and political sign of the advent 
of postmodernity in the West, the two postmodern positions discussed here, proto-
postmodernism and the traditional postmodern view, are better understood as “counter-
humanism” rather than “anti-humanism” because of their resistance to modern humanism’s 
conception of the human subject and humanity generally. However, the students maintain the 
human and the spontaneity of human subjectivity as central to its thinking, similar to its modern, 
liberal humanist predecessors, yet reject the totalization of modern humanism’s belief in Reason 
that dehumanizes people under Capitalism and Stalinism, similar to the postmodern position. For 
this reason, Hassan proclaims “[d]issent was part of the motive” of the student movements while 
“another … was visionary” (216). This optimistic dissent results from their simultaneous 
resistance of the authoritarian aspects of the bourgeois and Marxist social orders as well as their 
co-mingling of the liberatory elements of each ideology to construct a new humanism. To state 
the students’ resistant optimism in different terms, the students—as proto-postmoderns—are 
humanistically counter-humanist in their ethical and political thought, and although the 
development of postmodern theory turns away from the humanistic ethics of proto-
postmodernism, the poststructuralists maintain the counter-humanism of the 1968 rebellions.  
The juxtaposition of Hassan’s take on the sixities as a “post” of postmodernity and 
Arendt’s explication of the students’ confounding ideological stance yields a premise for 
comprehending a possible prologue to postmodernity, a proto-postmodernity. Emblematic of the 
period, the ethical and political ideals of 1968 complicate the humanism/counter-humanism 
binary critics use to differentiate between modernity and postmodernity because it rejects 
modern humanism in its theoretical and immanent forms on the grounds of preserving the 
spontaneity and contingency of human life, ultimately a different form of humanist thinking. 
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From the proto-postmodern perspective, the ruling binary thus is totality/contingency rather than 
humanism/counter-humanism, and this modification of the open/closed Cold War binary that 
Nealon identifies with postmodern theory not only defines proto-postmodernism but also 
indicates an in-between approach between modernism and postmodernism that simultaneously 
reproduces and resists both in its aesthetics and ethics. 
Aesthetically, the proto-postmodern position takes political commitment and action as 
one of its fundamental concerns and struggles with the humanistic and modern idea of a “center” 
from which one can speak, which diverges from the politics of postmodern literature. As Linda 
Hutcheon says in The Politics of Postmodernism, the postmodern mode is “that of a complicitous 
critique,” or the self-awareness that its resistance to ideology, which is inevitably bound to an 
ideological framework, never fully resists but always reproduces it in some way (2). Rather than 
developing an “effective theory of agency that enables a move into political action,” the 
postmodern “works to ‘de-doxify’ our cultural representations and their undeniable political 
import” (3). While it seems ridiculous to say any critique can operate without some measure of 
complicity in the ideologies it resists, especially as this position has itself become “doxified,” the 
complicitous critique self-sabotages itself by rendering it unable to move beyond the cognizance 
of its own complicity. Its de-doxifying exigency commands that the work participate in an 
endless loop of reproduction and subversion, making and unmaking. As Hutcheon notes, “If [the 
work] finds [a totalized] vision, it questions how … it made it” (Poetics 48). Postmodern 
literature thus questions endlessly in order to reveal the nature of its own textuality and its extra-
textual elements as wholly constructed.  
On this point, proto-postmodernism focuses more intensely on its extra-textuality, its 
relationship to the world and the political reality of its historical situation, to represent action or, 
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at least, to call for action. For instance, Invisible Man externalizes the struggle between the 
narrator’s “self” and subject positions as a “fight … with Monopolated Light & Power” (7). He 
conducts this “act of sabotage” against a capitalist institution, in this case a monopolized utility, 
in order “to carry on a fight against [those who make him invisible] without their realizing it” 
because he sees “[his] old way of life” as “based upon the fallacious assumption that [he], like 
other men, was visible” (5). The narrator feels as if he takes some of the power (literally and 
figuratively) back from the society that renders him invisible when he decides to stop “the 
routine process of buying service and paying their outrageous rates” (5). By contextualizing 
(in)visibility with an anti-capitalist stance, Ellison forefronts his novel with a mode of agency, 
offering readers an outlet of potential resistance for the battleground over the narrator’s own self-
definition. Unlike a postmodern work, the novel does not deconstruct how his decision plays 
back into capitalist life or question why he desires visibility. It asserts, “This is what I have 
chosen,” and breaks out of the postmodern loop of indecision. Refusing to admit its interpellation 
continuously, Invisible Man avoids questions such as, “Why do I desire visibility?” or “How 
authentic is the visible I?” Rather, it rejects invisibility and tackles the question “How do I 
become visible to others?” 
Likewise, though to a lesser extent in its determinacy, Yossarian’s free indirect dialogue 
as he contemplates his own complicity in Nately’s death, hinting at Heller’s own stance, calls for 
action: 
Yossarian thought he knew why Nately’s whore held him responsible for Nately’s 
death and wanted to kill him. Why the hell shouldn’t she? It was a man’s world, 
and she and everyone younger had every right to blame him and everyone older 
for every unnatural tragedy that befell them; just as she, even in her grief, was to 
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blame for every man-made misery that landed on her kid sister and on all other 
children behind her. Someone had to do something sometime. (414) 
In this passage, Heller foregrounds the idea of complicity itself as the problem that necessitates 
action. He recognizes “every man-made misery” is “unnatural” and constructed as do the 
postmoderns, implying everyone’s complicity in these structures, but he also invests a faith in the 
human capacity for reconstructing the world because Yossarian does not turn back and eternally 
question the how and why behind such constructions and the complicity that follows. Unlike the 
postmoderns, complicity is the premise, not the conclusion. Instead, Yossarian concludes that 
someone has to act to make complicity in human-made structures more bearable and humane. If 
we must always be complicit in our own constructions—the “human artifice,” as Arendt would 
say, that is a product of spontaneous human actions—then Heller argues we need to ensure we 
act in ways that construct a world where complicity does not degrade the dignity of the self or 
the other. 
 The representation of action in Invisible Man and Catch-22’s call to construct a more 
humane world aligns the politics of these novels more closely with Robert Genter’s “late 
modernism” than with Hutcheon’s postmodernism. Contrary to the postmodern variation of 
political engagement, Robert Genter, explicating the stance of late modernists in Late 
Modernism: Art, Culture, and Politics in Cold War America, characterizes the commitment of 
these writers as “one that refused to shy away from the notion that art at its essence was a form 
of rhetoric, persuasion, and social communication” (12). In Genter’s formulation, the late 
modernist literary work has an expressed and overt political purpose, acting as a medium to 
communicate its message to the reader. The aim of this communicative art, in the opinion of 
Kenneth Burke, who Genter sees as one of the critical exemplars of late modernism, demands the 
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artist “to offer new forms of orientation, new ways of understanding modern experience, and 
new sites of communion” because World War II destroyed common ethical and political 
concepts that grounded the conventions of modernist engagement (3).  
The last of these recastings of the modern project, the need for “new sites of 
communion,” predicates the political commitment of proto-postmodernism as well as part of its 
modern humanist parallels. According to Jeffrey Isaac in Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion, 
Arendt and Camus take this call to reconstruct a common site for communication as the most 
serious political task in the postwar world. As theorists, they look to “the promotion of dialogue 
[as the] key to the creation of freer, more satisfying forms of politics” where “ethical standards 
and public policies can be collectively agreed upon than arbitrarily imposed” (123-124). 
Politically committed to “seeking foundations … [whose] provisional character…. [recognizes] 
the enduring facts of human difference and plurality” (110, 124), Arendt and Camus advocate for 
a polyvocal politics and ethics grounded in the unifying, rather than separating, aspects of 
language because “totalitarianism exhibited a frightening and extreme form of human oppression 
that sought to suppress all difference through the manipulation of language and the suffocation of 
dialogue” (123). While their desire for unification hints at the totalizing excesses of modern 
humanism, they conclude that the arbitrariness of totalitarian language necessitates meaningful, 
referential language and ethical concepts based in pluralistic consensus in order to safeguard 
human dignity. Analogous to the site of political unity that Arendt and Camus see in dialogic 
communication, Heller and Ellison construct the novel as a place of communicative unification 
for readers, one which uses the characters’ thoughts and actions as representations of the 
potential for political engagement, whether against bureaucratic systems (Heller) or racial 
oppression (Ellison). In their struggle to unify, they concoct a political language to ground their 
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visions of resistance, exemplified by the titles of each novel, Catch-22 and Invisible Man. As 
signifiers, both titles express a way to talk about political and social realities, common terms that 
have moved into extra-literary discourse.
5
 Because of their commitment to represent the ailments 
of their political context, these works are as much ethical as they are aesthetic, compelled by a 
humanistic stance to question the world as they see it. 
 While Genter’s conception of “late modernism” has parallels with proto-postmodernism, 
late modernism’s definition remains contested with a lingering debate over its political import 
and aesthetic character. In Jameson’s view, the late modern—associated with the Cold War as in 
Genter’s work—produces a “theory of art, the ideology of modernism [or abstract 
expressionism] … which then accompanied [this theory of art] everywhere abroad as a 
specifically North American cultural imperialism” (168). Jameson conceives of late modernism 
as a calcified variant of high modernism where “experimentation” transforms “into an arsenal of 
tried and true techniques, no longer striving after aesthetic totality or the systemic and Utopian 
metamorphosis of forms” (166). While proto-postmodernism aligns more with Genter’s 
optimistic late modernism, Jameson’s pessimism raises an important point, although his 
conflation of late modernism with high modernism is problematic.
6
  
According to Jameson, modernism in its traditional form “[holds] to the Absolute and to 
Utopianism,” which he uses to classify Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot’s “extrapoetic, extraliterary 
concerns” as “the sign that they were genuine modernists…” (168). While this focus on the 
political has parallels in Genter’s late modernism, Jameson equates the period with a cultural 
imperialistic purpose distinct from Genter’s:  
Now, what was wanted in the West and in the Stalinist East alike, except for 
revolutionary China, was a stabilization of the existing systems and an end to that 
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form of properly modernist transformation enacted under the sign and slogan of 
modernity as such…. Now the Absolutes of [high modernism] have been reduced 
to the more basic programme of modernization – which is simply a new word for 
that old thing, the bourgeois conception of progress. (166) 
From an American imperialist standpoint, then, late modernism is to art what capitalism is to 
industry and the economy. High modernism becomes “the way” to create, just as capitalism is 
the way to produce and “representative” democracy is the way to organize the body politic. 
Modernity and modernization in artistic, economic, and political forms thus equate with stasis, a 
staid form of engagement reinforcing the Cold War political and economic paradigm. Jameson’s 
characterization of late modernism separates the blurring of postmodernism’s complicitous 
critique into a binary, that between the complicit and the critical, between the reproductive and 
the transformative. It is on this point that Jameson and Genter argue: while Genter sees late 
modernism as transformative and critical, Jameson views it as reproductive and complicit. On 
the one hand, Jameson equates late modernism with an evolved and co-opted high modernism; 
on the other, Genter claims modernism evolved its subversive politics to meet new challenges 
and contexts. 
 When placing Genter against Jameson, the transformations Genter identifies in Cold War 
American writing is the emergence of postmodernism (or proto-postmodernism) rather than a 
continuation of modernism, which contradicts aspects of how the postmodern is typically 
defined. As Lyotard argues in “Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?,” the 
postmodern “is undoubtedly a part of the modern” (79). Such a vague definition could be used to 
support a claim that either the calcified high modernism or evolved politics of late modernism 
are postmodern, but when Lyotard adds that “[a]ll that has been received, if only yesterday … 
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must be suspected” (79), the questioning yet committed stance of the late modernists in Genter’s 
thought makes them better candidates for being postmodern in Lyotard’s sense of the term than 
Jameson’s complicit twin. However, Andreas Huyssen, in After the Great Divide, takes 
Lyotard’s sweeping generalization to account for his conception of the postmodern. Untangling 
the implication of Lyotard’s use of the Kantian sublime to ground his emphasis on the avant-
garde, he calls attention to Lyotard’s contradictory “interest in rejecting representation, which is 
linked to terror and totalitarianism,” and the inherent “desire of totality and representation” 
contained in Kant’s concept of the sublime (215).
7
 For Huyssen, the divide between Lyotard’s 
application of the sublime and his rejection of its philosophical underpinnings means “[his] 
sublime can be read as an attempt to totalize the aesthetic realm by fusing it with all other 
spheres of life…” (215). Here, Huyssen identifies the ultimate conflict in postmodern theory: it 
ends up recasting the modern to the point where it produces Jameson’s late modernism, albeit in 
different packaging. Indeed, Lyotard’s valorization of a totalized avant-garde plays directly into 
the cultural imperialism Jameson sees in the abstract expressionism at the core of the ideology of 
aesthetic modernism.  
More generally, though, Huyssen comments that “French theory provides us primarily 
with an archeology of modernity….not as a rejection of modernism, but rather as a retrospective 
reading which … is fully aware of modernism’s limitations and failed political ambitions” (209). 
If the continual modification of and reflection on the modern defines postmodern counter-
humanism aesthetically and theoretically, then Lyotard certainly was correct in asserting that the 
postmodern “is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state” (79), but defining the 
postmodern in this way nullifies the “post-” signifying “after modernism.” Because the 
postmodern remains trapped in a continuous struggle with its introspection on the modern, the 
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self-awareness of its aesthetics and the counter-humanism of poststructuralist theory offers a 
perspective that limits its own transformative power. Postmodernism provides tools for 
understanding and conceiving the contours of modernity, but subverts its own commitment to 
overcome and transgress the modern. 
Because of postmodernism’s ultimately reproductive nature, proto-postmodernism 
presents a hybrid third way between the (post)modern when considering ethics and critical 
engagement with the modern, particularly between essentialist modern humanism and structure- 
and language-centric postmodern counter-humanism. As Davies says in his introduction, “[T]he 
question of humanism remains ideologically and conceptually central to modern – even to 
‘postmodern’ – concerns” (5). Recalling Pound and Eliot, Jameson argues their allegiance to 
Utopianism and the Absolute, ultimately abstract terms, marks them as “genuine modernists,” 
and because this stance derives from the political engagement of their writing, these desires 
reproduce the abstractions of political modernism. Davies explains that “abstract humanism, with 
its universalist and essentialist conception of Man … is a political rather than philosophical 
notion, deriving from the revolutionary discourse of rights” (25). He defines this abstract 
humanism as essentialist “because humanity – human-ness – is the inseparable … defining 
quality, of human beings” and universalist “because that essential humanity is shared by all 
human beings, of whatever time or place” (24). This idea of a transcendent, absolute human 
condition grounds the utopianism of the modernists, who attempt to encode individuated 
emancipation from modern life into their writing and aesthetics. For the modernists, “self”-
expression becomes the primary site of political and ethical thought, a problematic centering 
both from a postmodern and proto-postmodern standpoint. 
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Postmodern counter-humanism rejects the abstract and essentialist vision of humanity the 
modern humanists profess. As Hutcheon says in Poetics, “For many [postmodernists], it is the 
‘rationally, universally valid’ ideas of our liberal humanist tradition that are being called into 
question” (187), and as Davies notes, Friedrich Nietzsche inaugurates this questioning by 
focusing on the “figurative nature of all statements” and the linguistic genesis of all matters 
asserted as “truth” (36). With philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Foucault 
following in Nietzsche’s footsteps—what Davies calls the “‘linguistic turn’” in philosophy—
they reveal how “the ‘humanity’ to which [modern humanism] appeals is nothing more than a 
figure of speech, a metaphor so moribund and inert that we no longer recognise it as such…” 
(37). Postmodern counter-humanism thus unravels the abstracted “self,” itself an instance of this 
groundless metaphor, as well as abstracted “humanity,” yet it also maintains a faith in abstraction 
like the modern humanists. Calling back to Althusser’s Marxist “anti-humanism,” Davies 
articulates how his structuralism sees “the ‘subject’ … not [as] the individual human being, 
speaking and acting purposively in a world illuminated by rational freedom, but the impersonal 
… ‘forces and relations of production’… ‘operat[ing] outside man and independent of his will’” 
(60). Similar to Althusser, Foucault’s concept of discourse, like “the relations of production for 
Marx” or “ideology for Althusser,” centers on “capillary structur[es] of social cohesion and 
conformity … [that] situat[e] us as individuals, and silently legislates the boundaries of what is 
possible for us to think and say” (70). For postmodern counter-humanism, the center shifts from 
the self to the structure. Unlike the modern humanist who sees the self wholly determining 
identity through expression, the postmodern counter-humanist envisions the structure wholly 
determining the identity of its subject by constructing and delimiting boundaries around the 
subject’s action and thought. 
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If politically engaged writing that faithfully adheres to a modern humanist notion of the 
self as the ethical center characterizes modernism while postmodern counter-humanism 
questions modern humanism through privileging structures that nullify such ideas about the self, 
then what differentiates proto-postmodernism from either? In periodizing terms, the hybridity of 
proto-postmodernism has many similarities with the way Genter classifies late modernism. He 
argues that “Burke’s criticisms … predated what would become a larger revolt against the 
aesthetic and epistemological assumptions of modernism … associated with the movement 
known as postmodernism…” (3), and, on the level of conceiving the subject, “late modernists 
saw the self as formed through a series of identificatory and linguistic practices … [yet] refused 
to believe that the self was reducible to the context in which it was situated” (16). Wouldn’t this 
critical, yet engaged, artistic position make proto-postmodernism just a rebranding of late 
modernism? In a way, yes, but not necessarily. The crucial difference that differentiates the 
proto-postmodernists from Burke is their shared preoccupation with the ethical questions that 
violence provokes. For the proto-postmodernists, violence represents the fundamental 
problematic of political living and modern humanism generally. and their theoretical and artistic 
engagements center on disentangling the structures and abstractions that create violence and the 
violence’s destructive impact on individual dignity, whether the self acting on the other or the 
structure on the subject. On this point, proto-postmodernism overlaps with yet diverges from 
postmodernism as well because it critiques modern humanist systems and structures because of 
the violence it causes. However, the proto-postmodern writers frame their analyses and 
representations of these structures with respect to ethics and political life, maintaining a 
humanistic faith in individual autonomy and expressiveness because they envision language as a 
site of unity rather than division and commit to promoting political action and ethical thought, 
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not just questioning. Despite their underlying humanistic compulsions, they view modern 
humanism’s unbridled belief in the self’s expression and self-creation as a legitimating factor in 
violence. 
Arendt’s analysis of the students’ violent rhetoric and its genesis best encapsulates the 
proto-postmodern rejection of modern humanism’s excesses and its advocacy of the limits of 
humanistic agency.
8
 Pulling on the threads of the students’ principles, Arendt finds another 
major divergence between the student rebels and Marxism besides its moralism: its glorification 
of violence. Again, this contradictory exaltation points not to a misreading of Marx, but to the 
complicated ground between abstraction and political reality in modern humanism. In “[t]he 
strong Marxist rhetoric of the New Left,” Arendt sees “coincid[ing] with [this rhetoric] the 
steady growth of the entirely non-Marxian conviction, proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung, that ‘Power 
grows out of the barrel of a gun’” (Violence 11). While Arendt argues “Marx was aware of the 
role of violence in history,” she reads him as placing it as “secondary” because “not violence but 
the contradictions inherent in the old society brought about its end” (11). The turn of some of the 
student factions post-1968 into believing in violence as a means of social change roots itself then 
not in Marxist thought but rather, as Arendt outlines, the violence-as-ontology of Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Franz Fanon (12-13, 19-21).
9
 She quotes Sartre via Fanon as saying “that 
‘irrepressible violence … is man recreating himself,’” and she sees in his thought both “his basic 
disagreement with Marx on the question of violence” as well as his investment in modern 
humanism: “[T]he idea of man creating himself is strictly in the tradition of Hegelian and 
Marxian thinking; it is the very basis of all leftist humanism” (12). A different take on the self-
centricity of aesthetic modernism, Sartre’s and Fanon’s theories take political subjectivity of the 
individual as self-expression and self-creation through violence. Although they represent the 
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extremes of leftist humanism, the theoretical stance espoused by Sartre and Fanon, which the 
student rebels integrate into their thought, remains in the boundaries of modern humanism. On 
one hand, it holds a political vision centered on the human subject and its formation, and yet, on 
the other hand, the exigency of this formation requires the negation of the “other” through 
violence, much like the logical abstractions of totalitarianism but on an individual, rather than 
collective, level. The violent rhetoric in 1968 thus embodies an anti-humanist humansim, one 
which remains humanist in its theoretical abstraction but calls for an “immanent anti-humanism” 
to bring the self to fruition. In this instance, anti-humanist means serve modern humanist ends. 
The ultimate end of this form of anti-humanism, the essence of its excess that legitimates 
this violence for the proto-postmoderns, is Progress. As Arendt remarks, she believes the many 
inconsistencies in the students’ “loyalty” to Marxism “has something to do with the concept of 
Progress, with an unwillingness to part with a notion that used to unite Liberalism, Socialism, 
and Communism into the ‘Left…’” (25). Tracing the trajectory of this concept, she describes 
how at the “[b]eginning of the nineteenth century, all … limitations [to Progress] disappeared” as 
its “movement” was conceived to have “neither beginning nor end” (26). The allure of Progress, 
as Arendt sees it, is its ability “not only [to explain] the past without breaking up the time 
continuum” but also to “serve as a guide for acting into the future….giv[ing] an answer to the 
troublesome question, And what shall we do now?” (26). Progress settles the uncertainty of the 
future because “nothing altogether new and totally unexpected can happen” (27). It reduces 
social change, as with Marx or his revolutionary progeny Sartre and Fanon, or continual 
development, as with the imperialist capitalism such revolutionaries resist, down to a 
predetermined process. Unlimited Progress—the hangover of enlightenment and modern 
humanism—acts as the common ground between these oppositional forces within humanism, 
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fostering an ethical framework that legitimates any action, including violence and murder, that 
will conceivably march their goals into the future. The final legitimating factor both for the 
liberal humanist and its revolutionary counterpart is the metanarrative, whose center relies on 
this notion of Progress. Although modern humanists defend their violent actions by invoking 
metanarratives of human emancipation, an ideal that will come at some unforetold date in the 
future, the ethical counter-humanism of proto-postmodernists such as Arendt and Camus expose 
the illegitimacy of this claim because of its ties to totalitarianism and the infringements on 






“Is There a Logic to the Point of Death?”:  
Totalitarianism, Anti-Humanism, and Humanism’s Metanarratives 
 
Indeed, if Prometheus were to reappear, modern man would treat him as the 
gods did long ago: they would nail him to a rock, in the name of the very 
humanism he was the first to symbolize. 
               —Albert Camus, “Prometheus in the Underworld” 
 The insanity Nazism represented within modernity’s ethical framework brought into 
question collective faith in human progress and its modern humanistic origins. Its systematic 
violence and abuse of authority predicated a fracturing of Western postwar society’s confidence 
in modern humanism’s efficacy to prevent such trespasses against humanity, particularly for 
France, whose intellectual and political climate birthed much of the groundwork for 
poststructuralist theory. As Germaine Brée comments in her comparative critical biography 
Camus and Sartre: Crisis and Commitment, “[The Enlightenment] had been … a whole way of 
looking at life that, for the French, 1914 had shaken and 1940 had shattered” (39). The political 
fallout from the Occupation years recast the Enlightenment intellectual tradition as “a 
dangerously illusory fiction if not a downright lie,” causing the philosophical framework of the 
French intelligentsia to become “inextricably entangled in the process of reevaluation” (39). As 
Brée presents it, Camus and Sartre “are a certain degree representative” of the work done in 
untangling Enlightenment values as they “reoriented their thinking toward the social dimensions 
of the individual” after exploring the modern themes of estrangement and alienation in their early 
works (39-40). The failings of modern humanism’s self-centric ethics and their shared 
experiences in the Resistance to Nazi occupation prompted their commitment to this new task 
because modernist themes, engagements, and concepts, as Genter reminds us, could no longer 
respond to the political demands of the time. 
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 Camus’s invocation of the Promethean myth in the context of humanism, going beyond 
the symbolism of rebellion and revolt, lyrically calls attention to the divisions between his 
politics and Sartre’s, a precursory statement to their feud over political violence that split them in 
the 1950s. Leading into his claim about how his contemporaries would treat the mythical figure 
in “Prometheus in the Underworld,” he argues Promethean humanism “believes that both souls 
and bodies can be freed at the same time,” whereas “[m]an today believes that we must free the 
body, even if the mind must suffer temporary death” (139). Although this essay was originally 
published in 1947, it signals his stance on the constraints he sees underlying the abstractions of 
Marxist thought that dominated French intellectual circles. Camus illustrates his objection to 
Marxism most poignantly when he says, “[M]en today have chosen history … [b]ut instead of 
mastering it, they agree a little more each day to be its slave” (140). Between this provocation 
and the epigram’s claim, he highlights the troublesome relationship Marx’s philosophy has with 
the humanism/counter-humanism binary we have constructed in retrospect: the proletariat 
(humanity) is the agent of historical change, yet its agency will always remain subject to the 
forces and movement (or narrative) of History. Such complexities and discontinuities in 
Marxism’s relationship to modern humanism open the conceptual space for humanist values to 
invert its professed ends of enriching and emancipating humanity collectively into ideas that 
legitimate violence and anti-humanism. 
When viewed from an ethical angle, “discontinuity” provides a language to understand 
the humanistic ground from which proto-postmodern theorists’ critique Marx’s historical 
understanding. For Arendt and Camus, it represents the unrelenting modern desire to give human 
existence a dignified meaning in the wake of dethroning God and King. Camus asks in The 
Rebel, “But if we are alone beneath the empty heavens, if we must die forever, how can we 
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really exist?” (250). The moderns answer by “attempt[ing] to conquer a new existence” that lives 
by the principle “to be was to act” in the hope of “fabricat[ing] an affirmative … dismissed until 
the end of time” (250-251). As Arendt says in “The Concept of History,” conceiving history as a 
process of fabricating a determined end is an attempt “to escape from the frustrations and 
fragility of human action” driven by an inability “to cope with unpredictability” and “human 
plurality” (303, 294). When Marxism turns history into History, it concocts a story that places 
every action and event in a narrative chain progressing toward a predetermined end—an end that 
achieves continuity and totality, a “closed universe” that realizes the end of history. However, 
Arendt argues the process of fabricating this end could only come about through “[t]otal 
conditioning” because of the spontaneous nature of human plurality and sociality (303).
10
 Due to 
the discontinuities in the political world and history itself, Marxism thus necessitates methods of 
enforcing the truth of its “metanarrative”—its claim of knowing the story behind humanity’s 
collective emancipation—and as Arendt and Camus critique Stalinism’s totalitarian character, 
they penetrate how its violence, logicality, and terror results from the aspiration to achieve the 
Marxist metanarrative’s supposedly humanist and ethical end.  
Although the term “metanarrative” furthers our understanding of Arendt’s and Camus’s 
humanistic criticism of Stalinism, this philosophical concept originates with Jean-François 
Lyotard’s epistemological work in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, which 
does not explore modern humanism’s and the metanarrative’s complicity in totalitarian terror. 
Thus, in order to understand why Lyotard overlooks the political ramifications of the 
metanarrative as well as Camus’s exclusion from postmodern theory, a brief look into the Sartre 
and Camus quarrel throughout the 1950s over Stalinism will explicate the Sartre/Camus binary’s 
influence on the poststructuralist turn toward language, contextualizing the formative moments 
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of postmodern counter-humanism. Although the poststructuralists sought a “third way” out of 
Cold War politics, Charles Forsdick, in “Camus and Sartre: The Great Quarrel,” underscores 
how both Camus and Sartre had their sights set on a similar third form of political engagement 
between capitalism and communism, but the immediate and intense divisions in geopolitics 
caused a fracture in their commitments:  
In the political climate of the Cold War, with the collapse of any hopes of social 
revolution in France, Sartre (and to a lesser extent Camus) had briefly flirted with 
the idea of creating a third political force, the ‘Rassemblement démocratique et 
révolutionnaire’. When this project faltered … Sartre … drifted towards the 
French Communist Party (PCF); Camus … found himself increasingly unwilling 
to align himself with any orthodoxy or common cause. (121) 
Nealon’s “open/closed” binary and the search for a third way emerges here once again in 
contraposition to the Cold War paradigm, but in the generation prior to the poststructuralists. 
Unlike the postmodern counter-humanists, however, Camus and Sartre imagined this binary in 
the context of their political situation rather than philosophically, seeking to form a political 
movement apart from American capitalism and Soviet communism at first.
11
 Moreover, Brée 
notes the influence Sartre’s and Camus’s writings had on students of the era, observing that “the 
questions they had raised and the solutions they had adopted were … those debated by the 
insurgent students” (41).
12
 Framing the political issues of the time, Sartre’s turn toward Marxism 
and Camus’s resistance to its dominance on the left sketches the intellectual and philosophical 




However, like tumbling dominoes, their split along the boundaries of political violence 
also foretells the doom of leftist opposition in the sixties. Deconstructing Sartre’s and Camus’s 
“transform[ation] … into unapologetic Stalinist and reactionary apologist” stereotypes (Forsdick 
122), Ronald Aronson in “Camus and Sartre on Violence” moderately describes how “[e]ach of 
them … denounced a single dimension of contemporary violence, Camus targeting revolutionary 
violence and Sartre targeting the violence structurally imposed by social systems based on 
inequality” (68). Despite Aronson’s narrow reading of Camus, his insight into the ripples caused 
by Camus and Sartre’s fallout on this issue, sparked by the publication of Camus’s Rebel in 
1951, underscores the importance of this fracture in the French intelligentsia.
13
 He writes: 
After their split the Cold War’s ‘either/or’ would dominate the Left…. Much of 
the Left learned to justify one side or the other. Thus were the hopes of a 
generation to move toward socialism and freedom … to be dashed. People on the 
Left were pressured to make an impossible choice: between what became Sartre’s 
grim realism (communism as the only path to meaningful change), and Camus’s 
visceral rejection of communism…. Sartre and Camus voiced … the half-truths 
and half-lies of what became the tragedy of the Left – not only in France but 
across the world – for at least the next generation. Camus and Sartre came to 
insist [through their literature] that there were only two alternatives: Camus’s 
rebel and Sartre’s revolutionary. (72) 
Their spat had wider reaching effects than just a crumbling friendship: it set the terms of the 
Left’s counter-discourse through the Cold War period, constructing another political binary 
reflective of the larger geopolitical context. In the wake of their argument, the Left became 
fractured, factionalized around Arendt’s question, “And what shall we do now?” Modes of 
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political engagement and ethical thought thus calcified along lines already demarcated by Cold 
War geopolitics, and leftist dialogue closed off to the acceptance of either fighting for the 
Stalinist model or the implicit continuation of American capitalism. 
This backdrop of the Sartre/Camus political binary in France makes the poststructuralist 
search for openness more intelligible because it explains how the failure of these existential 
humanists to provide a tertiary mode of politics prompted the need for a new method of 
engagement. Thus the turn toward epistemology and language as politics and ethics collapses 
back on itself and reproduces modern forms of humanism. Even with this turn, political 
questions are not completely loff the table: as Huyssen notes, “Lyotard,” one of the only French 
theorists who has named and described the postmodern at length, “is a political thinker” (214).
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For Lyotard, who Alan Schrift notes was active in “third way” politics throughout the 1950s, the 
language of modern humanism, which legitimated various forms of knowledge in the form of the 
metanarrative during modernity, implicitly unravels into postmodernity.
15
 Despite his political 
attitudes and concerns, Lyotard’s analyses never clarify the political reasons behind the decline 
of metanarratives, and his oversight opens space for the proto-postmoderns to speak and 
complement his work on the beginnings of the postmodern period.  
While he indexes a series of political events that invalidate each metanarrative in 
“Missive on Universal History,” counting Auschwitz and May 1968 among them (29), Lyotard 
does not theorize a comprehensive framework that explains the political mechanisms of 
metanarratives and their consequences. In “Marxism, Postmodernism, Zizek,” Brian Donahue 
highlights this missing component when he writes how Lyotard’s epistemo-linguistic approach 
“precludes the kind of large-scale analyses that would allow adequate attempts to elaborate 
connections between the … theory he proposes and the social, economic, and cultural forces to 
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which he only occasionally refers” (par. 2). Such an accusation does not fall far from the mark, 
but Donahue’s cynicism deemphasizes the usefulness of Lyotard’s contribution to the discourse 
of postmodernity and the purpose of his approach. Contrasting Donahue’s analysis of The 
Postmodern Condition, Wlad Godzich clarifies the reason for Lyotard’s approach in his 
afterword to The Postmodern Explained, arguing that “[Lyotard] did not … seek an external 
cause … for the disinclination felt toward the metanarratives of legitimation, but attempted 
instead to locate it in these metanarratives themselves…” (114). Here, Huyssen reminds us that 
poststructural counter-humanists are the archaeologists of modernity, and Lyotard performs the 
same role in his theory on metanarratives: descriptive in posture and operating within 
modernity’s assumptions and premises. Such a stance, though, does not discredit Lyotard, as 
Donahue may want to suggest. Rather, reading Lyotard’s theory on metanarratives in 
conjunction with Camus and Arendt adds not only to our understanding of the postmodern 
perspective but also the role of totalitarianism in sparking the postmodern turn. 
Buttressing Lyotard’s deconstruction of the metanarrative’s linguistic and 
epistemological intricacies, Arendt and Camus examine the metanarrative’s political functions 
and implications, actively questioning its legitimacy (delegitimating it) as an ethical standard for 
judgment and action. Indeed, for Lyotard, delegitimation is inherent to the metanarrative itself, 
an inevitable process arising out of the proliferation of science, but for the proto-postmoderns, 
the metanarrative’s delegitimation is an act founded in an ethical criticism of political life, a 
reaction to violence and the anti-humanist ideologies that degrade dignity. Where Lyotard says, 
“[Postmodern] incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress 
in turn presupposes it” (Condition xxiv), Arendt rebuts, “Progress … can no longer serve as the 
standard by which to evaluate the disastrously rapid change-processes we have let loose [through 
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science]” (Violence 30). In short, the proto-postmodern exploration of modern humanism’s 
metanarratives exposes their liberatory claims as wholly absurd because they produce the 
opposite of human emancipation: a systematized violence that actualizes immanent anti-
humanism. By immanent, I mean immediate, “in the world,” real in the sense that either a 
lifeless corpse can be touched and witnessed or, from the standpoint of proto-postmodern 
humanistic ethics, oppression of the mind and body that coerces enslavement by logic or 
violence. At the center of this active delegitimation through fiction-making and theory are the 
metanarratives of Marxism and capitalism, viewed by the proto-postmoderns as one in the same 
because of their iron grip on Cold War political and ethical thinking and because of their mutual 
reliance on the Idea of Progress, whose logic breeds immanent anti-humanism and eternally 
defers dignity and emancipation to the future. Indeed, Progress itself as an idea embodies the 
absurd humanistic anti-humanism of modernity that the proto-postmodernists resist. 
 As Lyotard conceives it, metanarratives are at the heart of modernity and are linked to 
modern humanism. Rather than getting steeped in the contest over the technicalities engulfed in 
defining the “metanarrative,” a simplified interpretation from Lyotard himself serves as a better 
grounding for this discussion.
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 In his “Apostil on Narratives,” Lyotard clarifies: 
 The “metanarratives” I was concerned with in The Postmodern Condition are 
those that have marked modernity: the progressive emancipation of reason and 
freedom, the progressive or catastrophic emancipation of labor, … the enrichment 
of all humanity through the progress of capitalist technoscience, and even — if we 
include Christianity itself in modernity — … the salvation of creatures through 
the conversion of souls…. (17-18) 
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 Lyotard rebrands various modern humanisms in this passage under the name metanarratives: 
Enlightenment, Marxist, and liberal humanisms, respectively, alongside a Christian humanism. 
Indeed, speaking of Enlightenment humanism, Davies claims Thomas Paine’s “Age of Reason 
forms a link between what Lyotard calls ‘the two major versions of the narrative of 
legitimation’” in Postmodern Condition: the political narrative of humanity’s emancipation and 
the philosophical narrative of speculative knowledge (27). According to Angélique du Toit in 
The Lyotard Dictionary, these narratives legitimate because they “exer[t] a strong influence on 
what is considered true and just … [because they] act as a measurement against which other 
truths are to be judged” (86). As the sovereign truth and ethical standard, humanism gains its 
weight in modern thinking, which explains in part the counter-humanism of postmodern 
theorists, but on a closer inspection of The Postmodern Condition, these two types of narratives 
do not produce a homogenous mode of thought for Lyotard. Instead, the political and 
philosophical narratives diverge in how they express their humanist tenets along the lines of 
history and emancipation.  
 As Davies’s comment on Paine implies, the two narratives of legitimation Lyotard 
identifies—the philosophical (or speculative) and the political (or emancipatory)—are not 
intrinsically linked, but oppose each other in their relationship to human subjectivity. Davies 
notes this opposition when he argues, in connection to his reading of The Age of Reason, “[t]he 
two themes converge and compete in complex ways … and between them set the boundaries of 
its various humanisms” (27), which Lyotard’s epistemo-linguistic analysis details further. In 
Postmodern Condition, Lyotard describes the political narrative as holding “humanity” as its 
subject,
17
 while the philosophical narrative uses “the speculative spirit … embodied … in a 
System” instead (31, 33). While he formulates these narratives in terms of their relationship to 
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scientific knowledge, it is more important to focus on the theoretical implications of how each 
narrative situates science in its paradigm. The political narrative takes science as its object; it 
serves the narrative’s subject, humanity or the people, in its ability to self-govern. However, for 
the philosophical narrative, both science and humanity act as objects; the subject, an “idea of a 
System” or a “universal ‘history,’” sees these objects as “its own self-presentation and 
formulation in the ordered knowledge of all of its forms contained in the empirical sciences” 
(34). In humanist terms, the first centers on the human subject, taking the emancipation of 
humanity as its legitimating principle, but the second holds the process and movement of history 
as its center, where human emancipation acts as an affirmation of this movement. Its principle is 
Reason by virtue of its immanence in the human history it constructs, or, as Lyotard says in his 
“Missive,” “All that is real is rational, all that is rational is real” (29).
18
 Although Lyotard 
separates the speculative narrative, or Hegelian Idealism, from the emancipatory narrative, or 
Humanism “proper,” Hegelian philosophy remains invested in the value of human emancipation, 
but focuses on philosophical, rather than political, means.
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 When discussing the political contours of metanarratives, however, Lyotard abandons the 
speculative narrative of legitimation. Consequently, he signifies metanarrative solely with “the 
[political] narratives of emancipation” in his “Memoranda on Legitimation” (41), an essay on the 
relationship between mythic narratives, metanarratives, and totalitarianism, despite the term 
being associated only with the philosophical narrative in the body of The Postmodern Condition 
(34). The ultimate irony in this reversal is the antagonism Lyotard expresses toward the 
emancipatory narrative when he defines the metanarrative in Postmodern Condition: “But what 
[German idealism] produces is a metanarrative, for the story’s narrator must not be a people 
mired in the particular positivity of its traditional knowledge … [but] a metasubject in the 
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process of formulating both the legitimacy of the discourses of empirical sciences and that of the 
direct institutions of popular cultures” (34). The definitional language here implies that the 
political and philosophical narratives are distinct according to the narrator’s identity, and Lyotard 
privileges the latter when defining the metanarrative. While a collective notion of humanity tells 
the tale of its own emancipation in the former narrative, a transcendent, abstract subject speaks 
of “the becoming of spirit … in a rational narration” of history in the latter (33). Despite the 
application of the philosophical label to the speculative narrative, it still legitimates political 
institutions, implicating it in political modernity as Davies points out regarding Paine’s political 
thought. For Arendt, however, the symbiosis of political and abstract narrators embodies the 
missing link between totalitarianism and modern humanism’s metanarratives because of the 
nature of political ideology. 
 While Lyotard argues that “[t]otalitarianism … subject[s] institutions legitimated by the 
Idea of [emancipation] to legitimation by myth” (“Memoranda” 56), Arendt conceives of 
totalitarianism as subjecting political thought to legitimation by the abstractions of the 
speculative narrative. Her argument in “On the Nature of Totalitarianism” illustrates the 
domineering role of abstraction over politics in the totalitarian model rather clearly. 
Distinguishing the totalitarian dictator from the tyrant in order to extinguish claims that Nazism 
and Stalinism are merely tyrannies, she describes how “[t]he totalitarian dictator … does not 
believe that he is a free agent with the power to execute his arbitrary will, but, instead, the 
executioner of laws higher than himself” (346). The abstract, transcendent “laws of Nature or 
History” legitimate the actions of the totalitarian figurehead, and as Arendt interprets this type of 
legitimation, it inverts the end of human emancipation driving most metanarratives, a product of 
the Hegelian conception of history: “The Hegelian definition of Freedom as insight into and 
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conforming to ‘necessity’ has here found a new and terrifying realization” (346). Such 
legitimation through abstraction leads to inverting emancipation to signify freedom not for a 
collective idea of humanity but for a universal law that unifies reality and subjects humanity to 
itself.  
However, Lyotard acerbically contests linking Hegel and speculative discourse to 
totalitarianism. Responding to an attack by Gérard Raulet in “Postscript to Terror and the 
Sublime,” Lyotard reasserts the mythic quality of totalitarian legitimation: “[The totalitarian] 
appeal is to an inverse legitimacy, [not to achieving an idea in reality but] to the authority of 
roots and of a race placed at the origin of the Western epoch…” (68). Of course, he separates 
speculative discourse from totalitarianism rather than the speculative narrative, which may seem 
like an inconsequential nuance, but Arendt’s definition of ideologies, which “determine the 
political actions of the [totalitarian] ruler and make these actions tolerable to the ruled 
population,” clarifies the narrative’s role in providing legitimacy: “[I]deologies are systems of 
explanation of life and world that claim to explain everything, past and future, without further 
concurrence with actual experience” (“Nature” 349-350, emphasis added). In the case of 
ideology, the originary myth encompasses only one part of the narrative because ideology 
envisions a history from its origin to its end and appeals to an progressive explanation of history 
rather than a “founding” instance. Ideology and its speculative narrative links together all events 
in time according to a totalized principle, or law, that predetermines not only the narrative chain 
but also the actions needed to achieve its end. However, as Arendt observes, this principle does 
not necessarily adhere to reality, and Ellison’s Invisible Man represents the disconnects and 
discontinuities between ideological thinking and the spontaneous human reality outside its 
abstractions and the hold ideology has on those who believe in the speculative narrative. 
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While not representing totalitarianism in Invisible Man, the interaction of Ellison’s 
narrator with the Brotherhood complements Arendt’s thought by representing the mindsets of 
those faithful to its ideology. After seeing Tod Clifton, a former Brotherhood member, selling 
and performing with Sambo dolls on a street corner, the narrator reflects on this act “as though 
[Clifton] had chosen … to fall outside of history” (434). The fact that the narrator conceives of 
an inside/outside binary to history speaks to the ideological nature of his thinking; it replicates 
legal discourse, where “out-law” signifies being outside of the law, and people can fall inside or 
outside of a legal or social code. Beyond conflating history with legality, the narrator equates this 
inside position with meaningful, dignified existence and human emancipation as well, believing 
“[Clifton] knew that only in the Brotherhood … could [they] avoid being empty Sambo dolls,” 
yet Clifton’s “contemptuous smile” when he recognizes the narrator while manipulating the 
puppet implies both acknowledgement and an identificatory subversion of the narrator’s belief 
(433-434). Johnnie Wilcox speaks to the double meaning of “Sambo” during Invisible Man’s 
battle royale scene in “Black Power: Minstrelsy and Electricity.” He says, “When the ‘blonde 
man affirms with a wink’ what the M.C. says and calls the narrator ‘Sambo’ … [t]he wink 
announces … ‘Sambo’ is not just a demeaning epithet but also a contextually accurate naming of 
the narrator” (997-998). Clifton takes the place of the blonde man from earlier in the novel, 
another cyclical recurrence in the novel, and his smile announces that the narrator’s place 
“inside” history means he embodies the empty Sambo doll, while being outside history puts him 
in charge of the Sambo image. For Clifton, plunging out of history and ideological thinking 
means empowerment, a thought foreign to the narrator because he remains in the grasp of the 
Brotherhood’s Marxist ideology. 
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Indeed, Clifton’s “plunge” takes a greater and contrary significance for the narrator once 
he witnesses Clifton’s death at the hands of the police, foreshadowing his eventual defiance of 
the Brotherhood doctrinaires. The narrator’s initial anger at Clifton turns into questioning as he 
churns the meaning of being “outside history” while wandering in the Harlem community. A 
group of African-American boys sparks this shift, and he asks himself whether “history was a 
gambler, instead of a force in a laboratory experiment … not a reasonable citizen, but a madman 
full of paranoid guile and these boys his agents, his big surprise!” (441). His ruminations pull on 
the threads of the ideological concept of history his Brotherhood training professes. History is 
scientific and rational, a driving logic. By juxtaposing this view with a history personified as 
spontaneous and chaotic, he realizes the contingency of the reality around him: “They’d been 
there all along, but somehow I’d missed them…. They were outside the groove of history, and it 
was my job to get them in, all of them” (443). His ideological thinking, conceiving the world 
only in terms of history, produces his blindness to his community—to their dignity—and renders 
Clifton invisible once he falls outside the Brotherhood. Only after witnessing a moment of 
violence does he reconcile what actually happens with what is professed to happen, and the 
community’s visibility congeals if and only if they accept to be inside history and conform to its 
logic. When the narrator expresses his experiences and the reason why he valorizes Clifton at his 
funeral to the Brotherhood, he explains to them, “I’m describing a part of reality which I know;” 
however, one of the Brothers counters, “And that is the most questionable statement of all” 
(471). This rebuttal exposes how the Marxist Idea of history negates any reality outside of its 
ideology. According to its logic, Clifton cannot be reconciled and is outside of history because 
“the [Brotherhood’s] directives had changed on him” (478), but this view of reality effectively 
says, “To be outside the Brotherhood is to be outside history.” Its logic and only its logic 
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explains the world, yet as the narrator comes to realize, this ideological assumption cannot hold a 
monopoly on life and politics because of the spontaneity of human existence. However, the 
ideological thought of totalitarianism sees human plurality only as a barrier to actualizing its 
logic in the world, which, Arendt argues, “foreshadows the connection between ideology and 
terror” (“Nature” 350). 
Vonnegut’s Cat’s Cradle provides the most illustrative metaphor for the connection 
between ideology and terror because its technical description of the apocalyptic ice-nine 
demonstrates the intersectionality between speculative logic and anti-humanism, symbolically 
detailing both the socio-political and ideological elements that play into totalitarian terror. As Dr. 
Breed—the lead scientist at the Research Laboratory of the General Forge and Foundry 
Company—describes it, ice-nine relies on “‘a seed’ … a tiny grain” in order to “[teach water] 
atoms the novel way in which to stack and lock, to crystallize, to freeze,” and replicate its pattern 
(45). Thus, the seed of ice-nine functions like the domineering ideology of totalitarianism 
because it imposes a pattern, or logic, upon the atoms to which they are forced to adhere in order 
to actualize ice-nine in reality. To draw the connection between ice-nine’s metaphorical 
representation of terror further, Arendt deploys the phrase “atomized society” when recounting 
the socio-political conditions necessary for terror to dominate society, and this condition enables 
terror to have “the power to bind together completely isolated individuals” (“Nature” 356). 
Taken as a social and political metaphor, ice-nine describes both the social condition of terror, 
where individuals are “atoms,” and its result, the “binding together” and freezing of these 
atomized individuals according to a “seed” that produces a totality.  
While this metaphor for the terroristic paradigm under totalitarianism already represents 
an anti-humanist social order, where ideology trumps the spontaneity social and individual 
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human living, Vonnegut’s narrator presses Dr. Breed to reveal the global anti-humanist 
consequences of ice-nine, a parallel of totalitarianism’s aspiration to totality. Starting with a 
back-and-forth that explains how an entire swamp would freeze over by putting a seed of ice-
nine in a puddle, the narrator pushes him to extrapolate that eventually—after the swamp’s 
streams freeze over as ice-nine—lakes, rivers, oceans, and rain would also become ice and, as he 
exclaims in frustration, “that would be the end of the world!” (47-50). At the end of the novel, 
ice-nine precipitates a totalized, frozen world where all forms of life are eradicated and 
crystallized in ice as the scientist prophesied. Although this aspect of ice-nine does not perfectly 
parallel totalitarianism, which needs a social body in order to rule, it provides an allegory for the 
way totalitarian domination seeks to totalized the world and human society according to a single 
logic, a single “seed,” as well as the “human” aspect of society itself—its spontaneity.  
Again, Arendt’s thought is instrumental in understanding Vonnegut’s metaphor for 
totalitarianism. She claims, “For the totalitarian experiment of changing the world according to 
an ideology, total domination of the inhabitants of one country is not enough” because “[t]he 
existence … of any non-totalitarian country is a direct threat to the consistency of the ideological 
claim” (“Nature” 352). Because totalitarianism’s legitimacy relies on the complete consistency 
of its logic, it thus demands globalized coherence, a totalization of the globe that reflects its 
claims about reality, much like what ice-nine produces once unleashed on the world. It 
restructures and solidifies life according to its pattern, remaking the world and humanity in its 
image. However, whereas totalitarianism only aspires to totality, ice-nine automatically totalizes 
the world by virtue of its scientific and technological character, and this contrast between 
political and scientific totalization underscores the danger science poses to the continued 
existence of human life as well as its political consequences. Both in totalitarianism and its 
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symbolic representation in the totality of ice-nine, a single idea calcifies “human” variance and 
subjects the world to its truth, but as the scientific and apocalyptic nature of ice-nine implies, the 
logicality of modern science that produces violence proves to be even more insidious than the 
overt militarism and terror of totalitarianism, which Camus analyzes in each of his philosophical 
essays. 
Although Camus’s analysis of totalitarianism and its logic comes in his 1951 political 
treatise The Rebel, the problem of adhering to pure logical thinking also informs his earlier 
philosophical work The Myth of Sisyphus, published in 1942 under Nazi occupation. While The 
Rebel continues the project of delegitimating Marxism’s grip on political thought in France by 
reimagining the disastrous potential of modern humanism’s mode of legitimation through a 
totalized narrative, Myth hints at the ethical core of Camus’s thinking that resounds with his 
claims in The Rebel because, as Ronald Srigley explains in Albert Camus’ Critique of Modernity, 
“the famous ‘starting point’ arguments’” of both works express a desire for “a way beyond 
modernity’s conclusions while remaining faithful to its premises” (8). In “Rethinking the 
Absurd,” David Carroll remarks how a single “‘exigency’ informs Camus’s writings long after 
he abandoned the concept of the Absurd itself” and the propositions he laid out in Myth in the 
postwar years (54). Although he correctly characterizes Camus’s answer to this exigency as a 
“‘will to resist,’ even or especially when resistance appears hopeless” (54), Carroll glosses over 
what Camus identifies as the demand of his time—violence done onto the self and the other—
which is a much more significant thread between Myth and Rebel when considering Camus’s 
critique of modernity.  
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The opening pages of Myth lay out Camus’s intended method of exploration and the 
essential problematic of suicide he wishes to cover. Beneath his focus on the question of suicide, 
he reformulates the boundaries of his inquiry in terms of logicality:  
Shades of meaning, contradictions, the psychology that an ‘objective’ mind can 
always introduce into all problems have no place in this pursuit and this passion. 
It calls simply for an unjust—in other words, logical—thought…. Reflection on 
suicide gives me an opportunity to raise the only problem to interest me: is there a 
logic to the point of death? (7).  
Taking an anti-rationalist (and postmodern) stance when explicating his method, one which 
“acknowledges the feeling that all true knowledge is impossible” (9), Camus names purely 
rational thought as one of the central problematics enveloped in the question of suicide. Framing 
death in these terms, he places logicality at the center of his critique of modern philosophy and 
modern politics because, for Camus, the pairing of logic and violence are ever-present forces 
during both Nazi occupation and the Cold War era. “Does logic lead to violence?” Camus 
continues to ask from Myth to The Rebel, which extends his protest to modern rationality into the 
realm of political and historical thinking.  
While Myth looks into epistemological and personally existential forms of violence, 
affirming totalizing logic’s role in “philosophical suicide,” The Rebel centers on the question of 
murder, which he calls “logical crime” (3), and terror, a systematic violence whose speculative 
logic needs the ethical values of modern humanism in order to be legitimate.
20
 Concluding his 
thoughts on Stalinism, Camus writes: 
Those who launch themselves into [history] preaching its absolute rationality 
encounter servitude and terror and emerge into the universe of the concentration 
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camps…. The rational revolution … wants to realize the total man described by 
Marx. The logic of history, from the moment that it is totally accepted, gradually 
leads it, against its most passionate convictions, to mutilate man more and more 
and to transform itself into objective crime…. [Stalinism represents] the 
exaltation of the executioner by the victims…. [It] aims at liberating all men by 
provisionally enslaving them all. (246-247) 
While it seems ridiculous that the abused would place the abusers on a pedestal, Camus implies 
in this concluding flourish how this absurd position results from the subjection of the humanist 
value of emancipation to speculative logic—subjecting the ethic of dignity to the speculative 
narrative of History that is imbued with rationality. Because History extols human freedom and 
dignity as its end and is viewed as the only guarantee for these values, those who believe in its 
movement claim erroneously that “it is already, in itself, a standard of values” (247). Only by 
virtue of the political narrative of legitimation can doctrinaires bestow it with ethical value, yet it 
maintains legitimacy only if History remains consistent and moves along to its predetermined 
end. Thus, everyone in the political community must assert the objectivity and consistency of 
historical logic, or, in other words, the inevitability of emancipation’s eventual realization via 
History. The marriage of this modern humanist end of emancipation with faith in History’s 
abstract inevitability, for Camus, leads directly to violence and terror. 
  Thus, when it promises emancipation through a deterministic law of history, modern 
political humanism becomes an anti-humanism that kills and enslaves, inverting its own ethical 
values. Camus expresses this transition when he says, “The land of humanism has become … the 
land of inhumanity” (248). Matthew Sharpe’s reading of The Rebel in “Rebellion and the 
Primacy of Ethics” explains that Camus argues against the supposed humanism of Marxism 
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because its “founding principle or value … is a future community—a ‘we shall be’—whose 
pursuit renders secondary the people (or ‘we’) who happen to exist today…” (84), and as Camus 
announces, the realization of this future human community through historical inevitability will 
never come to pass because “[t]he idea of a mission of the proletariat has not … been able to 
formulate itself in history” (215). The “historical objectivity” of Marxism “has no definable 
meaning, but power [and terror] will give it a content by decreeing that everything of which it 
does not approve is guilty” (243). The idea of history, which guarantees the modern humanist 
end of emancipation and dignity, must rely on terror and anti-humanist means in order to remain 
objective and consistent because actual history has disproved its foundation premise. Because 
those bound in Marxist ideology continue to proclaim the inevitability of dignity at the end of 
History, it legitimates every death that has been framed as necessary to reach this end. Those 
faithful to history’s ability to realize freedom take the rebel Prometheus, who actively works 
toward humanist ends in the present, and nails him to a rock because his actions do not fit the 
historical paradigm. In an absurd twist, the modern humanism of Marx inevitably creates the 
violence of anti-humanism. 
Camus’s fervor when attacking Marxism, though, hides his anti-capitalist stance, an often 
overlooked aspect of Camus’s contribution to critical theory because of the stereotypes 
consequent of the Sartre/Camus binary. As Camus sees it, a major portion of Marxism’s 
ideological anti-humanism results from the modern bourgeois soil from which it grew, indicting 
capitalism’s claim to human enrichment through industrial production in the anti-humanist turn 
Marxist historical logic makes. Indeed, prior to his polemic against the legitimated violence of 
Marxism’s vision of history, he frames the Marxist metanarrative as an offspring of capitalism 
and enlightenment:  
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Marx’s scientific Messianism is itself of bourgeois origin. Progress, the future of 
science, the cult of technology and of production, are bourgeois myths, which in 
the nineteenth century became dogma…. [According to Marx,] [t]he inevitable 
result of private capitalism is a kind of State capitalism which will then only have 
to put to the service of the community to give birth to a society where capital and 
labor, henceforth indistinguishable, will produce, in one identical advance toward 
progress, both justice and abundance…. [This inevitable progress of production 
means] [t]he proletariat “can and must accept the bourgeois revolution as a 
condition of the working-class revolution.” (193, 204)  
As much as Camus condemns Marxism, he does so because it intensifies the capitalist faith in 
production and the scientific faith in progress. It not only tolerates but praises the perpetuation of 
modernity’s economic injustices and the degradation of human dignity. If we recall how Lyotard 
defines the capitalist metanarrative, he says its end envisions “the enrichment of all humanity 
through [its] progress,” so when Camus juxtaposes Marxism and capitalism, he illustrates how 
Marxism merely poses an addendum to capitalist humanism, which complicates the 
revolutionary aspect of its metanarrative. Marxist History maintains that the progress of capitalist 
production will realize “the enrichment of all humanity,” but then stipulates this production will 
eventually transform into a more humane and dignified form of labor.  
For Camus, this commonality has wider reaching effects in Marxism, determining its own 
idea of history because “[i]n that all human reality has its origins in the fruits of production, 
historical evolution is revolutionary because the economy is revolutionary” (197). Marxism’s 
speculative narrative, the transcendent logic to which all human reality conforms, thus derives 
itself from capitalism as well because it follows in step with the modern, capitalist notion of 
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economic and scientific progress. Camus reinforces this point when he says, “Nineteenth-century 
Messianism [or faith in emancipatory progress], whether it is revolutionary or bourgeois, has not 
resisted the successive developments of this science and this history, which to different degrees 
they have deified” (197). While Stalinism produces terroristic anti-humanism because it 
transposes its historical logic into political life, anti-humanism lies dormant in the metanarrative 
of capitalist humanism as much as in the Marxist metanarrative because they both deify progress 
as a guiding logic and principle in spite of the reality progress has created, which Vonnegut’s 
ice-nine echoes. Camus accounts for the divide between the logic and reality of progress when he 
says, “That is the mission of the proletariat: to bring forth supreme dignity from supreme 
humiliation” (205), meaning works must subject themselves to the enslavement of production 
before finding dignity at the end of history when the proletariat revolt will institute classless 
society. While he states this anti-humanism in respect to Marxism, the same can be said of the 
capitalist metanarrative—simply replace “the proletariat” with “economic progress”—which the 
proto-postmodern novelists aim to illuminate. Through their fictions, they represent the anti-
humanist products of America’s humanist metanarratives in order to delegitimate the ideologies 
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If, however, loss and violence may be deemed absurd, then we may imagine a 
way out of the dilemma of excusing violence done to victims or legitimizing 
revolutionary violence done to victimizers. It is possible to read … both 
Camus’s and others’ absurd ethics, in this sense, as endeavors to make loss 
and violence meaningless for the sake of delegitimizing loss and violence. 
             —Matthew H. Bowker, Rethinking the Politics of Absurdity 
 Although Bowker’s recent study on the connection between Camus’s Absurd and 
political theory makes significant inroads toward re-reading Camus’s oeuvre, his central thesis, 
which reads absurdity “as an endeavor … to make experience meaningless….[or] an effort to 
obfuscate or mystify experience,” embarks on a logic that hamstrings the import of Camus’s 
political and ethical insights (xv). While it serves his argument that absurdity is “the postmodern 
passion par excellence,” it misinterprets The Rebel by having Camus assert that violence is 
absurd (or “meaningless”).
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 Rather, Camus accounts for violence differently: “In terms of the 
encounter between human inquiry and the silence of the universe [which results in the Absurd], 
murder and suicide are one and the same thing, and must be accepted or rejected together” (6). 
Absurdist reasoning, as presented in Myth, famously rejects suicide by virtue of the Absurd and, 
therefore, rejects murder on the same note: in order to maintain the Absurd, neither the inquirer 
or the irrationality of the universe can be negated. For Camus, violence is not absurd or 
meaningless but a consequence of rejecting the Absurd either through self-negation (suicide) or 
the negation of others (murder), the physical manifestation of the refusal to accept that the world 
is “indifferent.” Thus, Bowker’s thesis is an analytical misstep; it connects the Absurd to a 
process of “making” or “fabricating” that Arendt and Camus identify as an aspect of violence. 
Instead, the Absurd is “the gap” dividing “the certainty I have of my existence and the content I 
try to give to that assurance,” the “divorce” between knowing I am human and the 
50 
 
constructions—the meanings—I impose on the world to remind myself of this humanity (Myth 
14-15). It is a feeling of morbid epiphany recognizing the meaninglessness of what we “know,” 
prompted when “the stage sets collapse” rather than a process (10), and seeing it as a process 
deprives absurdity’s theoretical import because it obscures absurdity’s potential function in 
political thought and literature. 
Deploying the Absurd as a literary tool, the proto-postmodern novelists exemplify how it 
can be used as a tool for intervening in ethical and political systems that degrade dignity, and 
critics have observed the role absurdity plays in each work. In the conclusion of “Invisibility, 
Race, and Homoeroticism,” Michael Hardin sketches the overlaps between racial and sexual 
invisibility in the context of the absurd choice of passing when “be[ing] freely visible and visibly 
free” signifies “public liberation” for Ellison and other authors (116-117). Although “lying about 
one’s identity [is] absurd” when liberation and personal dignity is the goal, he notes that 
“visibility brings about its own dangers” as he recounts two hate-motivated lynchings as recently 
as the 1990s (117). While Hardin connects Ellison’s use of absurdity with the anti-humanism 
Arendt and Camus see operative in modern thinking, Robert Scholes’s argument in “Black 
Humor and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.” sees the absurdity in Cat’s Cradle as a provocation to laughter: 
“Progress, that favorite prey of satirists from Swift and Voltaire onward, means that some people 
get free furniture and some get the plague … [b]ut the spuriousness of progress is not seen here 
with the [fiery indignation] of the satirist” (par. 11). In his interpretation, Scholes recognizes 
Vonnegut’s “affinit[y] with some existentialist attitudes” in his humor as well as his tongue-in-
cheek prodding at modern progress, but viewing Cat’s Cradle and the other proto-postmodern 
novels like Scholes does as solely “offer[ing] us laughter” instead of “scorn” and “resignation” in 
their use of absurdity misses the political and ethical intervention at the center of these works 
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(par. 11). However, Leon Seltzer’s take on the absurdity in Heller’s Catch-22 aims closer to its 
disruptive potential. At the outset of “Absurdity as Moral Insanity,” he clarifies “how the novel’s 
absurdities—comic and otherwise—operate almost always to expose the alarming inhumanities 
which pollute our political, social, and economic system” (290). In this ethical sense, absurdity 
as device for intervention unifies Invisible Man, Cat’s Cradle, and Catch-22. Through 
representing the absurd “gap” or “divorce” between the espoused ethical values of American 
ideologies (capitalism, scientism, and racism) and their immanent anti-humanism, these proto-
postmodern texts expose the absurdity of American humanism and of the idea of progress they 
rely on for legitimacy.  
Cat’s Cradle presents one of the lucid representations of modern humanism’s absurdity 
in its representation of the gap between capitalism’s claim to human enrichment through science 
and the intended purpose of ice-nine, the scientific product that precipitates the apocalypse at the 
end of the novel. In doing so, Vonnegut delegitimates the idea of scientific progress by exposing 
the banal insanity of “progress” as well as the immanent anti-humanism at the core of such 
banality. During the narrator’s foray into the past life of the deceased father of the atomic bomb, 
Felix Hoenikker, whom the narrator intends to write about in a nonfictional “account of what 
important Americans had done on the day when the first atomic bomb was dropped on 
Hiroshima” (1), Dr. Breed, a former colleague of Hoenikker, explains to the narrator what 
prompted Hoenikker to create ice-nine. Breed recalls how “a Marine general … was hounding 
[Felix] to do something about mud,” and as the general imagined it, “one of the aspects of 
progress should be that Marines no longer had to fight in mud” (42-43). Out of this request, 
Hoenikker develops ice-nine to fix the Marines’ “mud problem.” For the reader who knows that 
ice-nine causes the world to end, eliminating mud is incomparable to the consequences of the 
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solution, and the banality of the request in the name of “progress” calls into question not just the 
legitimacy of the request but the idea of progress itself. This modern “value” rings hollow when 
solving the mundane problem of mud trumps perpetual violence and war. Moreover, because 
progress leads to the creation of a scientific product dooming the world to annihilation, the 
underlying legitimation humanism bestows on the progress of science as an agent of 
emancipation becomes absurd: ice-nine would liberate the Marines from “two-hundred years of 
wallowing in mud,” yet realizing this liberation perpetuates war and destroys life in its totality. 
Just as Camus argues about Marxism, Vonnegut highlights how the deification of progress, 
scientific in this case instead of political or economic, opens the moral space for the violent and 
destructive means of ice-nine to be developed and deployed. 
In the same vein, Heller’s representation of Milo Minderbinder, the mess hall officer who 
establishes a capitalist conglomerate in Catch-22, exposes the absurdity of capitalism’s faith in 
unbridled profit as a vehicle of progress, emancipation, and dignity. Seltzer takes this absurdity 
and the absurd character of Milo as the central theme in Catch-22. While he views the novel’s 
absurdity arising from Milo’s supposed innocence when his actions are framed solely in terms of 
a loyalty to the “morally insane” logic of capitalism, Seltzer’s interpretation of this “innocence” 
routinely speaks to capitalist humanism’s absurdity. Reading the scene where Minderbinder 
“arranges and mercilessly executes the tremendously profitable deal with the Germans to bomb 
and strafe his own base,” Seltzer argues that “[Milo] is able to commit this cold-blooded atrocity 
with a clear conscience” because “his morally insane business ethic [makes human impediments] 
disappear altogether” (294). Likewise, he interprets Milo’s imposition of chocolate-covered 
cotton on the squadron as a foodstuff as evidence that “Milo’s ruthlessly capitalistic 
commitments do not, and cannot, support life” (295). Despite Seltzer painting “[his] treachery” 
53 
 
as being “innocently motivated by … [a] mistaken faith” (299), his numerous examples of 
Milo’s transgressions against humanity expose how capitalist logic promotes and abets such 
violence. Seltzer underscores the absurdity of capitalist humanism when he claims that “[Milo] 
idealistically envisions [his syndicate] as affirming humanity (since ‘everyone has a share’) at 
the same time that his bedazzled commitment to [profit] leads him systematically to trample on 
the rights of others” (302). While Seltzer’s article highlights how Milo embodies an “absurd 
innocence” (302), it also reveals the absurdity of capitalism’s humanistic logic without naming it 
directly. Indeed, for Milo’s violent actions to be deemed absurdly innocent when viewed through 
his commitment to capitalist logic, capitalism itself has to be absurd and anti-humanist for Milo 
to have the moral space to act “faithfully” within its ethical framework. 
Ellison takes the absurd anti-humanism of capitalist humanism a step further than Heller 
in Invisible Man by struggling with the absurdity of the relationship between American 
capitalism and racism. In the narrator’s ruminations during the epilogue, he reflects on the dying 
words of his grandfather and poses himself a series of questions as he tries to untangle its 
meaning.
22
  Two of these questions, related to one another, ask: 
Did he mean say “yes” because he knew that the principle was greater than the 
men, greater than the numbers and the vicious power and all the methods used to 
corrupt its name? Did he mean affirm the principle, which they themselves had 
dreamed into being out of the chaos and darkness of the feudal past, and which 
they had violated and compromised to the point of absurdity even in their own 
corrupt minds? (574, emphasis added) 
The principle he names, in the American context, evokes the humanism of the Declaration of 
Independence and the social foundations of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” 
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However, these humanist values were paired with the capitalist institution of American slavery.
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Richard Hofstadter notes in The American Political Tradition that Southern antebellum 
statesman John C. Calhoun argued for the slave’s relative dignity when compared to the 
devastating effects of free labor relations on workers in Europe (103). Despite such a claim, 
slavery’s inherent violence and human degradation, legitimated by economic and racial logic, 
undoes the underlying humanism of economic liberalism because it simultaneously dehumanizes 
African-Americans and excludes them from its emancipatory vision. Thus, Ellison reveals how 
the capitalist logic of enriching humanity, even from its inception, is an absurd notion because 
the institution of slavery functioned on an immanent anti-humanism and implies that such 
thinking aids in perpetuating violence, and thought is the starting point for lapses in humanist 
ethics. 
Complementing Camus’s concept of absurdity as a tool for understanding the function of 
each novel’s representation of American logics and their anti-humanism, Arendt’s concepts of 
“representative thinking” and the Socratic “two-in-one” offer a framework for interpreting the 
texts’ portrayal of self-contradictory thought, such as the case of Milo Minderbinder, as well as 
how such portrayals pose a rebellious counterpoint to the Cold War paradigm. This rebellion, 
like the novels’ use of absurdity, can also be understood in Camusian terms. As he describes it in 
The Rebel, rebellion “says yes and no simultaneously” (13). The contradiction of rebellion’s 
affirmation yet negation comes from its foundation “on the categorical rejection of an intrusion 
[by authority] that is considered intolerable and on the confused conviction of an absolute right 
which […] is more precisely the impression that [the rebel] ‘has the right to …’” (13). Springing 
from “a feeling of revulsion at the infringement of his rights and a complete and spontaneous 
loyalty to certain aspects of himself,” the rebel “[t]hus … implicitly brings into play a standard 
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of values,” yet because “the individual is not … the embodiment of the values [the rebel] wishes 
to defend [but] needs all humanity … to comprise them,” rebellion engages in the ethical 
discourse of humanism as well (14, 17). Because the proto-postmodern novels target their 
negations against the modes of thought and social hierarchies that create or lead to violence and 
dehumanization rather than humanism itself, they thus rebel against humanist logics by saying 
“no” to the violence anti-humanist ideologies produce while simultaneously affirming the 
humanistic value of dignity that they see neglected by modern humanism. For Ellison, Heller, 
and Vonnegut, the rebel (and humanity) has a right to dignity that is common to all life. 
However, the absurdity of modern humanism and its ethics are not self-evident because 
the novelists play with cultural logics that may also interpellate the reader into the ideologies 
they represent. Thus, the literary characters who act from these ideologies only can be 
understood as absurd or humanistically bankrupt by the reader if the novelist intervenes by 
representing the relationship between thought and action, as in the case with their use of 
representative and dialogic thought. In “Understanding in Politics,” Arendt explains that 
“understanding [is] the other side of [political] action” (321). Because thought and action 
continuously supplement and inform each other, the texts must go beyond representing modern 
humanism’s absurdity and also rebel against the thinking that allows its characters to commit (or 
be complicit in) violence while continuing to profess humanist ends. To do so, the novelists 
represent a humanistic character in their narratives, whether a protagonist or narrator, to contrast 
with the unthinking (or perverted thinking) of morally reprehensible characters in order to 
expose modern humanism’s anti-humanist logic and ethics. They contrapose a humanist 
character with an anti-humanist character, or humanism with anti-humanism, and this 
juxtaposition defines each novel’s rebellion. Camus elucidates this interplay between art and 
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rebellion as he concludes The Rebel, claiming that “art … give[s] us a final perspective on the 
content of rebellion” because “[a]rtistic creation is a demand for unity and a rejection of the 
world … on account of what [the world] lacks and in the name of what it sometimes is” (253). 
However, his analysis of the novel places emphasis on “the demand for unity” rebellion desires, 
and he argues that its “aim” is “to create a closed universe or a perfect type” (259). In this 
conception, the novel expresses metaphysical rebellion by creating a “perfect” universe in which 
humanity overcomes its limits and achieves the condition it desires.
24
 The proto-postmodern 
novel, on the other hand, creates a anti-humanist universe—the world that it negates—and 
represents it as absurd while also creating an individual in this world who rebels and affirms 
individual and collective dignity. 
Invisible Man most potently expresses this form of rebellion in its symbolism of Brother 
Tarp’s broken chain, and the narrator carries this symbol with him to the end of the narrative, 
where he lucidly expresses his own rebellion. During a conversation between Brother Tarp and 
the narrator, the elderly Brotherhood member tells the narrator the crime that led to his time on a 
chain gang. He explains, “I said no to a man who wanted to take something from me; that’s what 
it cost me for saying no, and even now the debt ain’t fully paid and will never be paid in their 
terms” (387). While the nature of his crime remains ambiguous, Tarp’s dialogue suggests he was 
jailed for rebelling against the demands of a debt collector or financier, and even after his 
imprisonment, he “kept saying no until [he] broke the chain and left” (387). This act, though, 
goes beyond simply saying “no.” As Tarp gives the broken chain link to the narrator, he explains 
“it’s got a heap of signifying wrapped up in it … think[ing] of it in terms of but two words, yes 
and no, but it signifies a heap more” (388). Tarp’s language evokes the exact wording of 
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Camus’s definition of rebellion and thus defines his act of saying no to imprisonment as an 
affirmation of his own humanity. 
Because the narrator carries this symbol of rebellion with him through the rest of the 
narrative, Ellison draws the connection between Tarp’s act and the narrator’s story. To 
emphasize this connection, of all the symbols he carries of his past life—his high school diploma 
that taught him humiliation is progress, the racist symbol of the Sambo doll, and an anonymous 
threatening letter revealed to be written by the Brotherhood leader who named him—Tarp’s 
chain link is the only symbol that remains at the end of the narrative because the narrator burns 
the rest for light in the sewers after he escapes the Harlem riots (567-568). Through this contrast, 
Ellison suggests the permanency and substance of rebellion and the hollowness of the narrator’s 
lives while following the capitalist and Marxist metanarratives. The act of burning them implies 
that the narrator figuratively says “no” to their paper-thin content and signals that he chooses 
visibility and solidity over darkness, and he proclaims his rebellion in the epilogue: “[A]fter 
years of trying to adopt the opinions of others I finally rebelled. I am an invisible man” (573). In 
rejecting those who named him, he declares his resounding “no” to their narratives and his place 
in them. Although “invisible” signifies an erasure of his humanity, his naming himself as such 
affirms his rebellion against his lack of representation in others’ minds, those who have dictated 
his existence in the past, which provides a language for him and others to represent his condition. 
As Ellison conceives the term, “invisibility” directly invokes Arendt’s concept of 
“representative thinking.” In “Truth and Politics,” Arendt claims that “[p]olitical thought is 
representative,” meaning that people “form an opinion by considering a given issue from 
different viewpoints, by making present to [their] mind[s] the standpoints of those who are 
absent; that is, [they] represent [others]” (556). In the prologue, the invisible man’s explication 
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of invisibility as a consequence of his existence being erased in the minds of others reflects the 
incapacity of representative thought. As he describes it, “[T]hey approach me [and] they see only 
my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination—indeed, everything and anything 
except me” (1). This passage indicates how his lack of representation in others’ minds produces 
his invisibility, how the narrator does not appear to those who “see” him. When the narrator says 
this inability to represent “occurs because of a peculiar disposition … of their inner eyes, those 
eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality” (1), he implicates their 
inability to think and judge in this condition as well, which Arendt calls a “blind obstinacy” 
(“Truth” 556). Because others subject him to erasure in their minds, they prompt him to question 
his human existence, forcing him to “wonder whether [he isn’t] simply a phantom in other 
people’s minds” (2). However, his phantasmal, invisible existence, besides having personally 
existential ramifications, takes an essentially political character when he ruminates on what 
creates such cognitive blindness, connecting racism and racially motivated violence with the 
limited space whites allow African-Americans in the humanist vision of American politics. 
  Because others are unable to “see” and represent him in their minds, they deprive him of 
his humanity and consequently exclude him from the American ideals of emancipation by fixing 
him into an inhumane, undignified place in its “humanist” narrative. Although the novel negates 
this condition, it rebels against anti-humanism by providing it a language and a concept, which 
then allows readers to represent the anti-humanism embedded in American humanism in their 
own minds. Although Shelly Jarenski focuses on the empowering potential of invisibility in 
“Invisibility Embraced,” her reading of the novel’s “battle royale” scene, where powerful white 
community members subject the invisible man to a bloody boxing match for entertainment, 
alludes to visibility’s political ramifications. She argues, “Whites can only ‘see’ the narrator 
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when he performs the roles expected of black men, as in this case when he can only give his 
speech after he has been dehumanized by the battle. Similarly, he can only visualize himself 
within the context of a black role that has already been officially recognized, specifically that of 
Booker T. Washington” (90). The narrator’s visibility thus depends on the anti-humanism of 
racist ideas, ones which subject the black body to violence, as well as a constrained idea of 
humanism, one which, as the narrator summarizes the speech he delivered at his graduation, sees 
“humility [as] the secret, indeed, the very essence of progress” (17). Here, Camus’s explanation 
of the proletariat’s supposed mission resonates with Ellison’s critique of racism: through the 
Washingtonian narrative of uplift, the African-American community must bring “supreme 
dignity from supreme humiliation.”  
Only through humility or humiliation, or, in other words, by foregoing his dignity, can 
the invisible man find representation in white minds, which is antithetical to the proclaimed 
ethics of American humanism and the ideal of equality. The narrator elucidates this absurd anti-
humanist humanism at the foundation of American political thought when he says in the 
epilogue, “You won’t believe in my invisibility and you’ll fail to see how any principle that 
applies to you could apply to me” (580). In other words, white minds conceive humanist 
progress in a way that erases the humanity of African-American being by demarcating restraints 
on what constitutes the “human,” excluding any representation of race other than white or 
subordinated, humiliated black-ness in the capitalist idea of human enrichment. His human-ness 
and dignity are never represented because visibility always depends either on whitewashing or 
inequality, but by having the narrator name “invisibility” and unravel what creates it, the novel 
gives readers a way to see how humanism applies to the invisible man. Its representations 
provide visibility to invisibility itself and provide readers the tools to think representatively when 
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they make judgments, reminding them of the invisibility, the erasure of African-American 
dignity, that the American narrative of economic progress and political equality historically 
entails.  
While Invisible Man rebels against the racial anti-humanism at the heart of American 
humanism, which gives readers language to think more humanistically and expand their capacity 
for representative thought, Cat’s Cradle uses representative thinking to expose how science’s 
“blind obstinacy” leads it to become complicit in violence. As Vonnegut creates the mindset of 
Felix Hoenikker, the scientist lacks the capacity for representative thought, which leads to a lapse 
in moral judgment that allows him to create ice-nine and indirectly cause the apocalypse. As 
Arendt claims, representative thought relies on a person “to remain in this world of universal 
interdependence, where [one] can make [herself] the representative of everybody else” (556). 
Hoenikker, though, divorces himself from this mutual world: one of the narrator’s interlocutors 
in Cat’s Cradle remarks that he had “never met a man who was less interested in the living” than 
Hoenikker (68). This disinterest renders him unable to represent anyone else in his thought 
because he makes minimal effort to relate with the human world. His negligence to account for 
the human world and the violent consequences of science leads to his failure to judge the 
consequences of his actions and his research. While Arendt views this lack of representative 
thought as only invalidating the impartiality of a person’s opinions or judgments, Daniel Zins’s 
reading of Cat’s Cradle in “Rescuing Science from Technocracy” pushes her concept of 
representative thinking to connect Hoenikker’s blindness to the inhumanity in which he 
participates. Before noting that “Felix … has allowed his own brain to be stretched only in the 
most narrow, technocratic manner,” Zins concludes that Hoenikker’s thoughtless character 
challenges our “prefer[ence] to blame our nuclear predicament on an unbridled technology” and 
61 
 
“suggests that it is our failure to be fully human that especially endangers us” (172, 171). 
Through Hoenikker’s blinding enamorment with science, Vonnegut thus vilifies absolute belief 
in scientific progress because it makes people such as Hoenikker narrow-sighted, corroding the 
sense of moral responsibility that defines our individual humanity and maintains the dignity of 
others. 
 What allows the persistence of such narrow-sightedness to represent others? In other 
words, what thought process leads a person to participate in logics that perpetuate anti-humanism 
while believing it emancipates and preserves dignity? Seltzer’s account of Milo Minderbinder 
accounts for one answer to this question when he names Milo as “innocent,” though “morally 
insane.” This insanity, Seltzer argues, is “a curiously innocent perversion of reason so total as to 
blind the actor from any meaningful recognition of the moral components of his (or anybody 
else’s) behavior” (292). Felix Hoenikker represents this same type of insanity: after the 
detonation of the atomic bomb, his remark to the idea that “[s]cience has now known sin” is, 
tellingly, “What is sin?” (Vonnegut 17). However, characterizing Milo’s or Hoenikker’s thought 
in this way leaves unanswered how they are able to follow the corrupted logic of capitalist 
techno-science and simultaneously maintain their innocence when the evidence of their 
complicity in violent acts should prompt a feeling of guilt. In these terms, another aspect of 
Arendt’s theory on the nature of thinking provides a method to understand how this absurd 
innocence is possible. 
In a section of The Life of the Mind, Arendt posits the dialogic “two-in-one” as the 
primary mode of thought, and she suggests that neglecting this dialogic relationship aids in 
absolving an individual’s conscience because, by avoiding dialogue with oneself, he or she never 
comes to take account of his or her actions. As Arendt conceives it, the “duality of myself with 
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myself” characterizes the two-in-one, where “I am both the one who asks and the one who 
answers,” and its dialogic nature means “[t]hinking can become … critical because it goes 
through [a] questioning and answering process…” (408). This dialogic thought process engages 
in a self-criticism and thus operates on the Socratic maxim, “It is better to suffer wrong than to 
do wrong” (410). Acting morally thus “keeps the integrity of this partner intact” and ensures one 
does not “lose the capacity for thought altogether” (“Truth” 559). As Arendt conceives it, 
individuals have a choice when they allow “a basic contradiction” to divide these interlocutors, 
such as committing murder: either take account of the action and reconcile oneself with the guilt 
or “never start the soundless solitary dialogue we call ‘thinking’” (“Two-in-One” 412). 
 Vonnegut represents the latter choice when accounting for the agents who precipitate the 
ice-nine apocalypse and their lack of thinking. The three children of Felix Hoenikker all embody 
the “unthinking” mindset, and their forgetfulness blinds them to their guilt and complicity in 
mass death and allows them to believe they act from a sound ethical framework. According to 
Arendt, the unthinking individual who chooses not to enter dialogue with himself or herself “will 
not mind contradicting himself … nor will he mind committing any crime, since he can count on 
its being forgotten the next moment” (412). The nature of unthinking therefore absolves any and 
all self-contradictions by nullifying unethical act itself, obliterating its existence in the person’s 
mind because he or she never account for it in their internal dialogue. 
Cat’s Cradle represents the centrality of unthinking’s role in abetting violence when the 
Hoenikker children fail to recall the details of the night they divided up their father’s invention 
among themselves. After the three children and the narrator clean up the ice-encrusted room of 
“Papa” Monzano, whose suicide initiates the total freezing of the world under the metaphorical 
terror of ice-nine, the narrator writes how their recollection of that night “petered out when they 
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got to the details of the crime itself” (251). The narrator signals here how the simple act of 
dividing up ice-nine itself was a crime, an anti-humanist act that should have precipitated a self-
contradiction in the Hoenikkers’ thinking because each of them armed warmongering nations 
with the means of total destruction (244). However, all they could remember was “what ice-nine 
was, recalling the old man’s brain-stretchers, [with] no talk of morals” (251). As David Ullrich 
argues in “The Function of ‘Oubliette,’” they “commit symbolic ‘oubliation’” in this instance, 
obliterating their memory “in order to … evade individual culpability and global responsibility” 
(150). While Ullrich reads the Hoenikkers as agents who “willfully repress memories of past 
events” (149), their ability to recall other details of the night yet inability to remember the 
obvious moral ramifications of this act indicates otherwise. They never thought about what 
dividing up ice-nine meant and never registered it as a crime. In doing so, they protect 
themselves from grasping their complicity in the world’s end, and this unthinking forgetfulness 
permits Frank Hoenikker, the one who is most directly complicit in the apocalypse, to 
“dissociat[e] himself from the causes of the mess; identifying himself … with the purifiers, the 
world-savers, the cleaners-up” (Cradle 242). Similar to his father and Milo Minderbinder, Frank 
perceives himself as innocent and part of the moral bastion of human progress. 
However, his innocence only makes sense in his own mind because his unthinking frees 
him from realizing his own ethical misstep, and Vonnegut’s representation of the Hoenikker 
children and their innocence is absurd because of the novel’s rebellion against their unthinking. 
With the narrator’s intervention, who poses the questions that expose their complicity, they 
cannot maintain their innocence in the eyes of readers. By naming and representing their act of 
dispersing ice-nine as a “crime,” like the account of their father’s inability to represent the 
violent and unethical consequences of science in his thought, the narrator acts as a humanistic 
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conscience. He calls these supposedly innocent characters to account for their actions either 
directly to them within the text or to readers. Through the narrator’s outrage at the Hoenikkers’ 
turn away from their consciences, Cat’s Cradle affirms its humanistic and ethical stance by 
having the narrator resist and rebel against the world constructed around him. Moreover, the 
novel presents the act of text-making as a sort of rebellion. The religious leader Bokonon, whose 
religion frames the narrator’s concept of the world throughout the novel, closes the novel with 
his last lines, which read, “If I were a younger man, I would write a history of human stupidity 
… and I would make a statue of myself, lying on my back, grinning horribly, and thumbing my 
nose at You Know Who” (287). The narrator, a Bokononist as he writes the novel presented to 
us, heeds the words of Bokonon and writes his own “history of human stupidity,” and he directs 
his rebellion, or “thumbing his nose,” at the anti-humanist thinking of Felix, the disingenuous 
humanism and innocence of Frank, and the violence of ice-nine he saw in his world instead of 
God. Through its representations both of the humane and inhumane elements of its world, the 
rebellious text enables the reader’s own two-in-one by reflecting the dialogic nature of thought in 
its dialogic universe. Using the two-in-one as a mode of intervention in combating anti-
humanism, it connects unthinking and absurdly innocent characters to the monologic thought 
that modern humanism’s logic engenders, which Camus critiques in The Fall as central to 
modern ethics.  
Like Frank Hoenikker’s self-deceit, Jean-Baptiste Clamence, the judge-penitent in 
Camus’s novel The Fall, takes extensive measures to avoid his conscience, which he 
aggressively acknowledges in his meandering monologue. Clamence reveals that at “the very 
moment” he felt “a vast feeling of power and … completion … a laugh burst out,” and as he 
describes it, this laughter had “come from nowhere unless from the water” (39). The connection 
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between water and this laughter is crucial; one of two moments buried in Clamence’s 
“monological confession,” as David Ellison names it in “Withheld Identity,” provide the 
necessary context to understand this event as a phantasmal invasion of the conscience.
25
 The last 
in the chronological sequence (rather than the twisting narrative sequence) shows Clamence 
neglecting to prevent a woman who plunges off a bridge from committing suicide (69-70).
26
 His 
conscience thus haunts him years afterward, manifesting itself in laughter emitting from the 
water, and it reminds him of the life he could have saved and figuratively calls him “home,” as 
Arendt would say, to rectify himself. However, prior to the laughter’s intervention, Clamence 
travels the same path as the Hoenikkers and chooses to forget the incident and the self-
contradiction it causes, which he reveals in his response to the narrative’s interlocutor about the 
suicide: “What? That woman? Oh, I don’t know…. The next day, and the days following, I 
didn’t read the papers” (71). David Ellison draws a similar conclusion of this scene, noting how 
“[i]mmediately after the telling of this central … event, Clamence … arrives at [his] Amsterdam 
residence, which [he] describes … as an abri, or ‘refuge’” (180). Jean-Baptiste thus maintains 
his innocence by putting his complicity out of mind through monologuing and making the event 
utterly banal. Instead of thinking, he takes symbolic refuge in the ignorance of his (in)action that 
led to a woman’s death.  
However, Clamence’s conscience continuously confronts him, and he chooses to look for 
other means of silencing it instead of reconciling his two-in-one and accepting his guilt. As 
Ellison claims, he turns to “verbose assertions of a generalised human guilt” as “a strategy of 
avoidance … [and] an attempt to hide from his own guilt” (181). Clamence speaks of this 
strategy when he uncovers the aim of his confession at the end of the narrative: “Now my words 
have a purpose. They have the purpose, obviously, of silencing the laughter, of avoiding 
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judgment personally, though there is apparently no escape” (131). This passage attains a 
particular significance if we read it in conjunction with Amit Marcus’s analysis of Clamence’s 
futile attempts to silence his conscience in “The Dynamics of Narrative Unreliability.” After 
detailing Clamence’s period of self-indulgence as an attempt to escape, Marcus says, “[T]he 
attempt of the narrator to forget the laughter succeeded merely for a short period…. [H]e realizes 
that the outcry of that woman and the laughter that ensued would never leave him, that he would 
never be able to immerse himself in self-forgetfulness” (par. 14). The incessant reminders of his 
crime of human neglect means his mind will always compel him to enter dialogue with himself, 
so he has to take recourse in other means in order to avoid self-judgment and put himself in 
agreement with his conscience, “[t]he only criterion of Socratic thinking” according to Arendt 
(“Two-in-One” 408).  
Because he refuses to think and engage with his conscience, Clamence must have others 
present to listen silently to and reproduce his confession in order to reconcile his guilt, and his 
method eradicates the dialogic nature of the two-in-one and of communicative speech by binding 
it into a monologue. In this relationship, where he continuously professes his guilt to strangers, 
he symbolically embodies his conscience and gives it a voice, ironically silencing his thought by 
externalizing the two-in-one and projecting it into a monologic form: he paints a “portrait” of 
himself that “becomes a mirror” to his listener (140). In constructing this portrait, Clamence 
produces a representation of his conscience, which he reflects onto his listener. He thereby 
renders the capacity for representative thought useless because the listener cannot represent him 
or herself or any other person in their mind; only Clamence is heard and represented. Thus, his 
monological confession constricts the listener’s mind into reproducing his guilt, and in binding 
his listeners to regurgitate his confession, Clamence dissolves the dialogic nature of conversation 
67 
 
and thought alike into a monologue where only his voice and his representation of the world 
exists, which, for Camus, leads to terror.
27
  
Because Clamence’s form of discourse constrains the listener’s representative thought 
into a monologic form, he also distorts his listener’s ability to judge his actions according to 
humanist standards, which provides him final absolution. Returning to Arendt’s theory on 
thinking in “Two-in-One,” she argues thinking “does not create values … [and] does not confirm 
but, rather, dissolves accepted rules of conduct,” and she names this aspect of thought its 
“purging component” (413-414). Because this purge “brings out the implications of unexamined 
opinions and thereby destroys them,” it has a “liberating effect on … the faculty of judgment,” 
which handles “particulars without subsuming them under general rules which can be taught and 
learned,” by enabling a person “to say ‘this is wrong’”(414). If the two-in-one relies on being in 
agreement with oneself, then thought must also interrogate common-sensical “values, doctrines, 
[and] theories” to see if they will lead to a contradiction in the particular self (413-414). Out of 
this interrogation, a person is then able to judge whether a universalized or socially accepted 
value will be a just standard for action or speech in a particular situation. The connection Arendt 
draws between thinking and judging helps explains why Clamence’s method targets his listener’s 
capacity for representative thought. Through the process of pontification and repetition, by 
mirroring himself onto the listener, he silences the listener’s thoughtful interrogation of guilt’s 
universality, which coerces his listener to judge every particular—especially Clamence 
himself—according to an anti-humanist “doctrine” of universal guilt. Forced to take Clamence’s 
assertion that humanity is, was, and always will be guilty as universally true, the listener then 
judges Clamence’s choice to neglect saving a life as acceptable. In his logic of guilt, he is 
absurdly innocent even if he is “an enlightened advocate of slavery” and fundamentally opposed 
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to the ideals of emancipation and dignity. His absurd way of thinking legitimates any and all 
violence he may commit because everyone is already declared guilty and deserves punishment 
(Fall 132).  
Using Seltzer’s language of “absurd innocence” to describe Clamence clarifies an 
important point about logicality in both Catch-22 and The Fall: Jean-Baptiste Clamence’s 
monologue expresses a Catch-22 when applied to judgments about guilt and innocence. In 
“Negation as a Stylistic Feature in Joseph Heller’s Catch-22,” Laura Hidalgo Downing concisely 
breaks down the propositional structure of the novel’s (il)logical “catch” as follows: “If you are 
crazy you can be grounded / If you want to be grounded you have to apply / If you apply you are 
not crazy” (4.3.14).
28
 Clamence’s monologue constructs a similar logical pattern that assumes 
guilt is universal: “If you judge Clamence for his actions, he is guilty / If he is guilty, you are 
also guilty / If you are also guilty, you cannot judge Clamence for his actions.”
29
 As Downing 
clarifies, Catch-22 “is a kind of trap that prevents the proposition You can be grounded from 
ever being applicable” (4.3.14). Likewise, Clamence’s logic forbids his listener from ever 
passing judgment on him. The listener cannot say “he is guilty.” His logic affords him a logical 
escape hatch to “permit [him]self everything again, and without the laughter [the judgment] this 
time” (Fall 141-142). While Catch-22’s namesake most clearly binds its characters into flying 
combat missions and continuing war endlessly, Milo Minderbinder expresses a logical trap (or 
trapdoor) similar to Jean-Baptiste Clamence. As Seltzer claims, the name “‘Minderbinder’ may 
possibly have been contrived to suggest Milo’s amazing ‘binding of minds’ through his steady 
deluge of self-serving capitalist rhetoric” that is supported by its own Catch-22 (299). 
Like Jean-Baptiste Clamence, Milo relies on capitalism’s humanist claims to permit 
himself to act in whatever way he wishes by binding Yossarian’s capacity for judgment, which 
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produces a Catch-22 that disrupts Yossarian’s thinking. An argument between Minderbinder and 
Yossarian over Milo’s responsibility for a man who died in an absurd military engagement, 
where Milo “realized a fantastic profit” from defending and attacking a bridge simultaneously, 
foregrounds Minderbinder’s logical twist (261). Reacting to “Yossarian’s angry protest” that 
“[he] organized the whole thing…. [and] got a thousand dollars extra for it,” which makes him 
guilty for the man’s death, Milo invokes capitalism’s metanarrative to make Yossarian complicit 
in his actions: “But I didn’t kill him. I wasn’t even there, I tell you…. And I didn’t get the 
thousand dollars. That thousand dollars went to the syndicate, and everybody got a share, even 
you” (262). Punctuating his rebuttal with “even you,” Minderbinder constructs an identical logic 
to Clamence. Rather than universal guilt, however, he uses the capitalist assumption that 
“everybody has a share of the syndicate’s profits.” If the syndicate profits, Yossarian profits; 
therefore, he is as guilty as Milo for the man’s death and thus cannot pass judgment without 
judging himself as well, and this logic expresses how capitalist anti-humanism gets an ethical 
pass. 
While this binding of Yossarian’s mental faculties conveys a localized instance of Milo’s 
and capitalism’s Catch-22, the pages follow Minderbinder globalizing these bonds of guilt after 
he conducts a bombing raid against his own squadron, which “looked like the end for [Milo]…. 
until he opened his books to the public and disclosed the tremendous profit he had made” (264, 
266). Despite official condemnations and “clamor[s] for punishment” (266), Minderbinder 
sidesteps guilt for his actions and legitimates the violence he commits on society en masse by 
resorting to the same universal humanist assumption that deflected Yossarian’s judgment. Even 
on the societal level, Milo deteriorates collective judgment, allegorically representing, according 
to Gary Davis in “Catch-22 and the Language of Discontinuity,” “the close alliance between 
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conceptions of language, society, and economics within the modern intellectual order” (72). 
Although Davis bases this reading of Minderbinder on the discontinuous relationship “between 
the [syndicate’s] shares and a ‘reality’ beyond,” a discontinuity readers can see only because of 
Yossarian’s (and Heller’s) intervention, he adds that what “M & M Enterprises reminds us” is 
how “violence and the characters’ often unusual attitudes toward violence are inseparable from 
the question of discontinuity” (72). When considering “Milo & Minderbinder” and the capitalist 
order he represents, the discontinuity in the responses to violence and acts of violence revolves 
around guilt and innocence. These categories have become meaningless in capitalist humanism’s 
system of logic and its imposed assumption of universal enrichment. Because of the logic’s 
circular structure, Yossarian and society as a whole must remain silent and refrain from judging 
Milo’s actions as wrong and anti-humanistic in order to maintain their innocence. Milo’s 
deflection of judgment and dissent, however, represents only only one connection between the 
Catch-22’s linguistic structure and the novel’s dysfunctional bureaucratic language. 
In order to distort concepts of judgment, the Catch-22 depends on the bureaucracy’s 
ability to manipulate language and reconstruct reality into a narrative. In The Language of War, 
James Dawes reads Catch-22 in order to explore “how language functions within a system of 
institutionalized violence” (162). Regarding the dislocation of referential language in the novel’s 
bureaucracy, with “referential refer[ring] to the ways verbal representations are mapped … to the 
material world,” Dawes argues that the novel “presents a language system in which the dictates 
of authority rather than referentiality determine manner of representation….[where] moments of 
description become performative speech acts” (163, 188). The difference between the descriptive 
(or denotative) and performative here is crucial. In Postmodern Condition, Lyotard calls each a 
“language game” between sender, addressee, and the referent—the object being represented in 
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speech (9). In the denotative language game, the sender and addressee are “in the context of a 
conversation … [where] the addressee is put in a position of having to give or refuse assent” over 
the sender’s description of the referent, which is a dialogic speech paradigm that affords the 
addressee space to judge what is said (9). For the performative, however, the meaning of the 
referent “is not subject to discussion or verification on the part of the addressee,” which is a 
monologic speech paradigm that does not allow the addressee to judge the referent’s meaning 
(9). Thus, when a language system distorts denotative descriptions into performative utterances, 
such as in Catch-22, it constructs narratives, which “themselves … have authority” rather than 
the speaker (23).
30
 With referential descriptions transformed into narratives, anyone outside 
positions of authority, such as Yossarian, can no longer make judgments about the world or 
about themselves once they become objects of the narrative; the heads of the bureaucratic 
structure predetermine these judgments by constructing objects into a narrative, which results in 




Yossarian’s commanding officers confront him with such an ethical bind by blurring the 
intersection between the guilt/innocence and complicit/critical binaries into a Catch-22, which 
dislocates such concepts in order to maintain the organization’s innocence, legitimacy, and, 
therefore, authority by manipulating the course of Yossarian’s service into a narrative of 
brotherhood and complicity.
32
 After Yossarian’s repeated refusals to fly more combat missions, 
the basis for the invention of the Catch-22, Colonel Korn and Colonel Cathcart offer him a deal 
to send him home (430), and the content of this chapter, entitled “Catch-22,” details the military 
bureaucracy’s attempt to co-opt Yossarian’s rebellion. Their first exchange represents the first 
blurring of guilt and innocence in this multi-layered Catch-22: Yossarian is responsible and 
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guilty for the outfit’s low morale because he refused to fly more missions rather than the fact that 
the officers raise the number arbitrarily so that no one can be released from duty (430-431).
33
 
Yossarian must accept this premise and implicitly admit his guilt if he wants to go home, and if 
he does not and asserts his innocence, he will be court-martialed. However, as the last chapter, 
“Yossarian,” reveals, Yossarian will inevitably be found guilty because “[i]f [he] were court-
martialed and found innocent, other men would probably refuse to fly missions, too” (453). To 
ensure his guilt, the military court will charge him with “rape, extensive black-market operations, 
acts of sabotage and the sale of military secrets” (452). Most of these crimes were actually 
committed by Milo, and because Milo merges into the military’s bureaucratic complex (457-
458), imposing these actions onto Yossarian thus absolves both Milo and the bureaucracy of its 
guilt. More significantly, though, this constructed narrative of guilt makes Yossarian’s only 
possibility for innocence impossible, resulting in another Catch-22 because they revise the 
crimes of others and apply them to Yossarian’s personal narrative.
34
 He will be guilty either way 
despite being right when arguing that the number of missions keeps getting raised, and because 
being court-martialed will not realize the aim of his rebellion—to have the officers send him 
and/or his fellow pilots home and cease subjecting them to further violence because they fulfilled 
their duty—the only option he has to rebel is to accept the offer. 
Accepting their offer, however, produces the final Catch-22 that reconstructs his rebellion 
into complicity, which explains why Korn and Cathcart seemingly acquiesce to his demand for 
recognition. Colonel Korn explains the “catch” as such: “Like us. Join us. Be our pal. Say nice 
things about us here and back in the States” (436). Conjoining this performative to Yossarian’s 
rightful release from duty, Korn thus rewrites Yossarian’s rebellion into a narrative of solidarity 
and complicity. The Catch-22 reads, “If Yossarian rebels, then he will be sent home / If he is sent 
73 
 
home, then he will praise the officers and be their friends / If he praises the officers, he does not 
rebel.” The logical structure voids Yossarian’s rebellion because it forces him to affirm, rather 
than resist, the officer’s decision to raise the missions and keep everybody at war. In addition, 
Korn expresses full awareness of the way this revision negates Yossarian’s humanist affirmation 
when imploring him not “to be a fool [and] throw it all away just for a moral principle.” (437). 
Yossarian also recognizes that going home and praising the officers would be “a pretty scummy 
trick [he’d] be playing on the men” (437). It would effectively remove his affirmation of 
dignity’s commonality from his act, localizing this right only to himself, while having him 
profess the legitimacy of the officers’ decision to keep the squadron bound in perpetual war. 
Thus, to go home, which would mean “his act of rebellion had succeeded” as well as affirmed 
his innocence, collapses the value of his actions into their opposites, into complicity and guilt 
(439). While Yossarian maintains a forgetful mental blindness to this discontinuity at the end of 
“Catch-22” in the name of self-preservation, acquiescing to Korn’s Catch-22 (438), he reverses 
his decision two chapters later, in “Yossarian,” declaring how he “see[s] people cashing in on 
every decent impulse and every human tragedy” and decides he will run to Sweden to pursue his 
moral responsibilities (455, 461). Yossarian “seeing” in his mind the violence consequent of 
Milo’s and the military’s anti-humanism determines this change of course because of the 
intervention of the penultimate chapter, titled “Snowden.” 
Unlike Jean-Baptiste Clamence in The Fall, Yossarian heeds the haunting image and 
memory of Snowden’s death to enable his ability to judge, and his rebellious actions against the 
violence of the bureaucratic and capitalist logics represent his attempt to reconcile himself with 
his conscience and make right his complicity in systemic violence. While Yossarian’s reaction to 
the invasion of his conscience differs from Clamence, Catch-22’s treatment of memory parallels 
74 
 
The Fall. In “Trauma and Memory in Catch-22 and Slaughterhouse-Five,” Alberto Cacicedo 
posits that “Snowden’s death is never actually recollected and enacted in its full horror” until the 
end of the novel because “Yossarian’s memory has worked its way around [it], giving the reader 
flashes of the event…” (359). Like the woman’s suicide and the laughter of Clamence’s 
conscience in The Fall, Catch-22 buries Yossarian’s memory of Snowden in its narrative and 
weaves small recollections and hauntings throughout the narrative structure, but as Bill 
McCarron argues in “Catch-22, Gravity’s Rainbow, and Lawlessness,” this “deja vu facing of the 
Snowden death scene, numerous times but with ever-increasing clarity … allows Yossarian to 
face himself” (678). “To face himself” means to engage in the two-in-one of thought, and 
because of the odd narrative continuity between the chapters that book-end Yossarian’s recovery 
of this memory, Heller suggests that facing his conscience is part of a continuous process, rather 
than discontinuous like so many other thematic elements in the novel. This critical narrative arc 
has Yossarian presented with the illusionary choice of liberating himself through complicity (like 
Clamence), Yossarian next engaging in thought and purging the conventions of Milo and the 
military bureaucracy, and then he chooses to rebel by escaping the system binding him. This act 
of thinking, Cacicedo claims, “becomes the impetus for the ethical challenge that he takes up in 
the final chapter” (360). Recalling Arendt’s theory on the relationship between thinking and 
judging, Yossarian’s dialogic self-conversation through remembering Snowden’s death liberates 
his faculty for judgment. For Yossarian, Snowden’s death never should have happened, and by 
submitting himself to Korn’s Catch-22, the military bureaucracy will only perpetuate the 
production of more dead Snowdens. Thus, his silent dialogue enables him to reject the idea of 
going home, and to the notion of continuing his complicity, he says, “This is wrong.”  
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Moreover, his recollection contains the two standards of judgment available to him, 
which Peyton Glass’s concise reading of the chapter elucidates as “the humanistic, represented 
by the dying gunner, Snowden; and the mechanistic, represented by Milo Minderbinder…” (25-
26). His thought thus confronts him with the choice either of negating or affirming the 
normalized standard of conduct—Milo’s assertion that “[w]hat is good for M & M Enterprises is 
good for the country”—that legitimates Milo’s theft of morphine from the bombers that deprives 
Snowden of comfort and dignity in his last moments (Catch-22 446). Because he remembers 
Snowden and converses with himself over accepting the various narratives of the military 
bureaucracy or Minderbinder’s capitalism, Yossarian can judge the inhumane consequences of 
following and believing in these narratives, enabling him to say no to the Milos, “Peckems, 
Korns and Cathcarts” standing “[b]etween [him] and every ideal” and to change this ideal in 
order to affirm the Snowden’s dignity and the ethical principle of life as he reads it in Snowden’s 
entrails: “The spirit gone, man is garbage…. Ripeness was all” (454, 450). At its core, the 
rebellion of proto-postmodern humanism promotes an ethic of dignified existence that combats 
modernity’s systemic and legitimate violence. 
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Continuities in American Literature of the Past and Present: 
Constructing Postmodern Ethics 
 
Using their literature to conduct a humanistic rebellion, the proto-postmodernists stand 
between modern and postmodern positions because they neither engage in making humanism 
meaningless like the counter-humanistic “linguistic turn” nor advocate for using metanarratives 
of progress as a legitimating force to achieve emancipation and dignity as expressed by modern 
humanists. Rather, this rebellious literature resists the consequences of humanism from a 
humanist standpoint, vindicates a revised humanistic ethic of dignity and life “in the present,” 
and suggests how to maintain this value without slipping into the moral blindness of modernity. 
By staging this rebellion through literature, posing a limit to the violence modernity abides, these 
proto-postmodern novels demonstrate how fiction has the capacity to develop a moral 
philosophy as well as a third way of critiquing modernity and capitalism without resorting either 
to period binaries (humanism/counter-humanism) or modernist political binaries 
(Marxism/Capitalism) that reproduce the Cold War paradigm. 
More than representing the novel’s rebellion against capitalist anti-humanism and its 
absurd humanism, however, Yossarian’s rejection of the nationalist narrative as a functional part 
of the capitalist metanarrative judges not only capitalism as illegitimate but also Lyotard’s “little 
narratives” as well because of nationalism’s connection to violence. These little narratives, of 
which nationalism is an instance, contrast from the totalization of metanarratives, demonstrating, 
as Tony Purvis argues, “how knowledge [and legitimacy] is both decentralised and localised” 
(134). While Lyotard proposes these little narratives as the “way out” of modernity’s 
legitimation crisis and as a new grounding for postmodern society, Catch-22’s representation of 
Yossarian’s confrontations with Milo and Korn, along with the narrative monologue of 
Clamence in The Fall, show the binding and destructive power of narrative construction. 
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Likewise, in “The Trials of Postmodern Discourse,” Ihab Hassan reminds us that Lyotard’s little 
narratives, or “petites histoires, can prove nearly as much terrorist as Marxist totalities prove 
tyrannical” (200). If even Lyotard’s atypically political theories cannot solve the problem of 
legitimacy, then poststructural counter-humanism does little to provide an ethical foundation 
from which one can act. As Hassan writes in the 1980s, “[E]ven Language, youngest divinity of 
our intellectual clerisy, threatens to empty itself out, another god that failed,” that literary theory 
gives us “no way to make sense of … our lives, immersed as [we] are in an ever-changing sea of 
signifiers,” and poststructuralism “can only tease us into further thought, not anchor our 
meanings” (196, 202). While valuable, poststructuralism only provides us a method, a set of 
analytic tools, to understand language’s complicity in power structures. It shows how the 
language of Humanism privileged “Man” over “human,” but it suggests neither standards nor 
values. Rather, the poststructuralists act like the dialogic partner in modernity’s “two-in-one”: 
their epistemological and linguistic theories give Western society its “purging component” that 
opens the space for ethics and judgment to reemerge in a postmodern form, which the proto-
postmodernists anticipated in their literature and theory. Beyond the proto-postmodernists, 
however, contemporary literature has begun this process of reevaluating Language and ethics. 
In the introduction to Succeeding Postmodernism: Language and Humanism in 
Contemporary American Literature, Mary K. Holland surveys the poststructural counter-
humanism/modern humanism binary that has dominated theory in the humanities, paralleling 
Linda Hutcheon’s assessment of postmodern theory as an rejection of liberal humanism (3), and 
supplies evidence both for the usefulness and limits of poststructuralism. She explains that the 
project of poststructural counter-humanism “[seeks] to recognize a fundamental unknowability, 
particularity, and multiplicity in truth and identity that would end the marginalization, 
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reductiveness, conservatism, and colonialism of humanist ways of thinking” (4). It opens our 
understanding to “a more varied representation of what it means to be human than humanism 
allowed,” Holland observes, but poststructuralism at its extreme also “fail[s] to recognize that 
some of the goals and beliefs of humanism remain worthy and in fact crucial to the continued 
production of art and literature, and perhaps even our continued humanity” (4). The transition 
from language to Language—when our concept of language moves from seeing it as a 
problematic in social life to conceiving it as an absolute and universal determinant, an ironic 
absolute (or “fixed”) arbitrariness—perceives the central signifier of humanist thought, the 
“human,” as so determined by language that the human content of the world is ruled by 
“incommunicability, irrelevance, or, worst, nonexistence of meaning and real things” according 
to Holland (4)—that floating signifiers, detached from a referent, reproduce themselves to the 
point where their arbitrariness becomes immanent in the world.  
If we recall the Cold War open/closed binary Nealon proposes in Post-Postmodernism, 
then the deification of Language itself becomes closed despite its desire for openness. While its 
theories on language and knowledge give us the tools to “encount[er] the text and its 
representations of the human as continuous with, rather than discrete from [as the moderns 
believe], the world and the culture in which they were created” (4), poststructuralism divests 
language’s communicative (between people) and referential (“human” signifying a content 
instead of a sign) possibilities. Poststructural theory aids in realizing not all language holds to 
these qualities, as in the totalitarianism and the anti-humanist humanisms that the proto-
postmoderns resist, but to maintain that Foucault’s “discourse” explains knowledge in its totality 
or that Baudrillard’s “simulacrum” describes the totality of the sign’s mediation in “hyperreality” 
reproduces the same totalizations of modernity but with different terms. The modern, totalized 
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view of language as self-expression and creation inverts to the postmodern, totalized view of 
language as disconnected from the world outside structures, signs, and discourse. In either 
concept of language, ethics and judgment, which deal explicitly with the particularity and 
plurality of existence, are sacrificed or transformed into universals that lead to violence. 
Confronted with the totalities of modern humanism, the proto-postmodernist resist with an 
appeal to the right of particular, yet universal, dignity, and confronted with similar totalities in 
postmodern counter-humanism, contemporary literature seeks to reconstruct human connections 
through the communicability of the dignity of “human-ness” in language. 
The contemporary literature that Holland discusses and the proto-postmodern literature 
and theory I have analyzed share these ethical and humanistic compulsions, but because they 
write in different periods—the former “after” poststructuralism and the latter prior to it—their 
ethics express themselves in different ways. Written after the “linguistic turn” and the dominance 
of poststructuralism in our theories of the world, contemporary humanistic literature is 
“inherently and essentially poststructuralist in its assumptions about language, knowledge, and 
the world—always conscious of the struggle, and specifically the struggle through language and 
representation, necessary to access any version of truth” (Holland 201). The counter-humanist 
tendencies of contemporary literature then coincides with the typical postmodern view, but as a 
methodology or a “mode” of writing; they do not combat Humanism proper like the 
poststructuralists or the proto-postmodernists. Rather, contemporary American writers maintain 
the poststructural position of “the arbitrariness and problems of language, and yet still [use] this 
… poststructuralism to humanist ends of generating empathy, communal bonds, ethical and 
political questions, and, most basically, communicable meaning” (17). Holland’s thesis about the 
contemporary turn toward humanistic thinking helps forefront the importance of the proto-
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postmodernists as the reevaluation of poststructural counter-humanism begins: despite 
recognizing the validity of poststructuralist ideas about language and how it functions, 
contemporary writers rebel against incommunicability and struggle to rediscover human 
solidarity and dignity through language, to redefine what it means to be human, and to reinvest 
belief in language’s, and particularly literature’s, communicability in the postmodern context.  
 While there is not enough space to cover all of Holland’s insights, her work indicates that 
the postmodern “project” is entering a new phase after our confrontations with totalitarianism, 
the Cold War, and postmodern disaffection. The project now is reconstructing ethical values 
without resorting to monologic language and narratives, and the proto-postmodern novels and 
theories, though written during the deconstruction of modernity’s humanist underpinnings in 
which they took part, offer a potential postmodern ethics to ground our capacities to think, judge, 
and act, a project which contemporary humanist literature carries into the future. Because 
Holland and I share the conception that contemporary and proto-postmodern writers are neither 
“separate from the project of modernity or of modernism, [nor] from the project of 
postmodernism” (201), a reinvigoration of humanism permeates their writings. Although, these 
beliefs express themselves differently—contemporary writers affirm human “truth, belief, and 
knowledge” in the face of and through poststructuralist language (201), while the proto-
postmoderns affirm human dignity and freedom in its confrontations with and through modern 
political thinking and language. Writing during the formative moments of poststructuralism, the 
proto-postmodernists view truth and knowledge, especially in its communicability through 
language, not as their central problematic like contemporary writers, but rather how modern 
versions of truth, knowledge, and discontinuous, non-referential language produces violence. 
Proto-postmodern resistance and rebellion counters modern Humanism because of their shared 
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humanist value of dignity, and from this value, they believe in the self’s ability to know and to 
communicate the world around itself, which is a precondition for the proto-postmodernists’ 
ability to judge the violence of modernity. 
Like modern, liberal humanists, the proto-postmoderns believe in our capacity for 
referential thought and communicative language, viewing it as a site of resistance to violence 
that they take as the central problem in the worlds they represent in their novels and theories. For 
these humanistic counter-humanists, discontinuous language and thought—that which is non-
representative of its world—abets violence. George Orwell includes an illustrating example of 
the relationship of discontinuous language and violence in “Politics and the English Language” 
when writing about the euphemisms used to describe Soviet terror: “People are imprisoned for 
years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck, or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber 
camps: This is called elimination of unreliable elements” (807). In Arendtian fashion, he says the 
erasure of violence in this euphemism allows a speaker “to name things without calling up 
mental pictures of them” (808). Representative thought begins with representative, referential 
language that accurately names and describes the world, and from the proto-postmodern 
standpoint, discontinuous language hides the real violence and immanent anti-humanism 
underneath its words, doing a figurative sort of violence on the human capacity to think and 
judge. Rather than acquiesce to the arbitrariness of language, the proto-postmoderns resist by 
attempting to name violence as it appears in the world. The Hoenikkers dividing and distributing 
ice-nine brought about the end of the world; it is a crime. The social visibility of Ellison’s 
narrator depends on his humiliation; his dignity is invisible. Milo orchestrated the military action 
that killed people in his own unit; he is guilty. Indeed, as Orwell writes after providing his 
example of the euphemism used to describe Stalinist violence, “[I]f thought corrupts language, 
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language can also corrupt thought” (808). Because of this reciprocal effect between thought and 
language, the proto-postmodern novels are central to understanding the violence of scientism, 
racism, and capitalism: they provide representations that run counter to traditional and 
preliminary conceptions of these legitimate American ideologies, communicating how actions 
and conditions refer to violence done onto human life.  
Communicating the connection between these ideologies and the violence they cause, the 
novels of Vonnegut, Heller, and Ellison aid us in representing in our minds the violence 
underneath the language and narratives supporting unlimited progress in science and capitalism 
or the othering of African-Americans that excludes them from American ideals of freedom. In 
counter-humanist fashion, their novels deconstruct the discontinuity, or the absurdity, of 
American Humanism and its narratives: their claims to enrich human life and dignity hollow out 
in the frozen world of ice-nine, in the illuminated hole the invisible man falls into to see himself, 
and in the scrawled “A Share” of the syndicate’s profits on a napkin. Moreover, the political 
deconstructions of these proto-postmodern novelists rely on a belief in the commonality of 
dignity because, in order to be seen as hollow and absurd, the novelists need a value from which 
they can judge American Humanism. Through the use of referential representations to rebel and 
say “no” to the violence abetted by Humanism, unraveling its legitimacy when compared to the 
humanist ethic of dignity, their novels communicate a “limit” on unfettered adherence to 
American ideologies, a belief that supports and refers to a common human value that should not 
be infringed. The best expression of the commonality of dignity comes in Yossarian’s 
interpretation of “Snowden’s secret” as Yossarian futilely attempted to save his life, reading that 
“[r]ipeness is all” as Snowden lay dying, In this interpretative moment, Catch-22 communicates 
to its readers that Snowden’s “ripeness,” his very fact of existing, is the expression of his dignity, 
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and because this reading prompts Yossarian to refuse continued complicity with the Milos and 
Korns of his world, the novel also communicates that dignity should be the central value against 
which we should judge actions in the world outside the text. Suggesting a value in its climactic 
moment of recovering memory, turning Yossarian back to remembrance and thought, the novel 
crosses the boundary of fiction and becomes a site of ethical thought. 
Writing about the political commitments of French existentialism, Arendt mentions how 
the existentialists “look … to politics for the solution of philosophic[al] perplexities that in their 
opinion resist solution or even adequate formulation in purely philosophical terms,” and she 
believes their investment in politics “is why Sartre never fulfilled (or mentioned again) his 
promise at the end of [Being and Nothingness] to write a moral philosophy, but, instead wrote 
plays and novels…” (“European Political Thought” 437). Although Camus ought to be included 
in Arendt’s assessment, her point remains: the novel is a site of exploring ethical questions and 
communicating the ethical values at the foundation of our continued living in a pluralistic, 
political world, and the proto-postmodern novels give us one of the most illuminating examples 
of the intersection between ethics, politics, and fiction and the novel’s potential in constructing 
ethics. Because judgment and political thought rely on representations of the particularities of the 
world outside ourselves, the novel enables these mental faculties when we encounter the text 
with already crafted representations of the world and its particulars. While all novels have this 
capacity to enable our political thinking and judgment, these proto-postmodern novelists take a 
further step in communicating the need for reevaluating our standards of judgment after 
modernity. Like the existentialists, Vonnegut, Heller, and Ellison take the political content of 
their culture as their mode of posing ethical questions, and they represent not only the absurdities 
and discontinuities of Humanism but also represent “a way out” of thinking through Humanism’s 
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metanarratives by representing characters who rebel against the violence Humanism supports 
and who hold a truly humanistic value. Despite all three novels ending with their characters 
grasping for some sort of escape—Yossarian escaping to Sweden, the invisible man 
contemplating in a basement apartment, and the Jonah-esque narrator of Cat’s Cradle writing in 
a cavern—their narratives compel the reader to think and to act humanistically, to break the 
narrative chain of History like Brother Tarp in Invisible Man by contemplating other lives and 
people presented in their narratives and conversing with them. Through the affirmation of dignity 
underlying these novels, the proto-postmodernists reorient the values modernity had distorted yet 
continued to profess, asking the reader to do the same as we continue to depart from modernity 
and into postmodernity. 
With our further understanding of the monologic nature of narratives themselves, 
however, is there a guarantee that the ethics of humanism that the proto-postmodernists write 
into their narratives do not slip into the same moral blindness of modernity? Fortunately, I 
believe the dialogic character of texts, theorized by Russian formalist Mikhail Bakhtin, who is a 
precursor to French poststructuralism, gives readers the necessary resistance to the mentally 
binding elements of narratives. Echoing Arendt’s observation of the intersection of ethics, 
politics, and literature, Geoffrey Harpham reminds us that “[w]ithin ethical theory, narrative 
serves as the necessary ‘example,’ with all the possibilities of servility, deflection, deformation, 
and insubordination that role implies” (401). Texts will always subvert themselves internally 
through their language and externally when each interpreter encounters them. Moreover, the act 
of writing fiction is itself dialogic: in “Intelligence and the Scaffold,” Camus says, “One must be 
two persons when one writes” (212). The writer thus encodes their own internal dialogue, their 
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two-in-one, and representative thought into his or her work, which produces part of its ethical 
capacity.  
Although these encodings safeguard the text from becoming another legitimation factor 
in violence, we must remember that the modern philosophers who constructed Humanism’s 
metanarratives in the first place produced texts. Modern philosophy’s role in Humanism and its 
violence suggests one of two things: either fiction provides a better grounding for ethical thought 
and values, or fiction holds the same dangers as philosophy when we consider what makes 
violence legitimate. It seems this is not either/or; rather, it is and/both. As Camus introduces the 
myth of Sisyphus in Myth, he recalls for us that “[m]yths are made for the imagination to breathe 
life into them” (89). While we need myths and fictions to orient ourselves in the world because 
they suggest standards and values in their representations and make our world more intelligible, 
we also give them content, which is why we must discern and judge the values lurking between 
the words and narratives we produce and read before we act. As the (meta)fictitious religion of 
Bokononism in Cat’s Cradle proclaims, “All of the true things I am about to tell you are 






 See pg. 120. Nealon prefers the word “poststructuralist” in this instance. While Andreas 
Huyssen in After the Great Divide would object with this substitution (214),  I believe, because 
poststructuralism dominates the postmodern theoretical paradigm, this conflation describes how 
we conceive at least part of the postmodern. 
2
 See Davies pg. 39-71. I will explore some of the contours of liberal, socialist, and what 
critics typically name “anti-humanism” in the first section. 
3
 To identify these tendencies singularly with the American instance of 1968 is a bit 
reductionist, ironically reproducing a kind of American Exceptionalism postmodernism resists. 
See 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt, ed. Ronald Fraser, for a comparative perspective that 
demystifies Hassan’s assertion. 
4
 See Fraser 108 and 287-8 for some of the impetuses prompting this turn toward 
structural Marxism. 
5
 A simple search in any library database for the phrase “Catch 22” will pull more results 
out of areas such as organization studies than literary studies, and the term “invisibility,” for 
example, is a central term in our discourse of justice for the homeless. 
6
 Part of Genter’s central thesis sees “late modernism” as distinct from “high” and 
“romantic” forms of modernism, and the purpose of his book is to clarify these categories in 
context of post-war American culture. 
7
 Lyotard defines the sublime as the result of “a conflict between the faculties of a 
subject, the faculty to conceive of something and the faculty to ‘present’ something … when the 
imagination fails to present an object which might … come to match a concept” (“What is 






 Although this idea of limits is the thesis of Camus’s political thought, Arendt’s account 
provides a concise description of these modern excesses. 
9
 See also Varon’s Bringing the War Home, pg. 101-103. Speaking of the radicalized 
Weather Underground faction of the New Left, he claims that they “made violence the measure 
of authenticity … champion[ing] Sartre’s provocative dictum that revolutionary violence ‘is man 
re-creating himself….’” (102). 
10
 Arendt’s concept of “action” and Camus’s “rebellion” coincide in this view of politics 
and history, although Camus’s language is less clear and concise than Arendt’s. In On Violence, 
Arendt argues “the political [realm’s] … essentially human quality is guaranteed by man’s 
faculty of action, the ability to begin something new” (82, emphasis added), and Camus says the 
rebel acts “in terms of the obscure existence that is already made manifest in the act of 
insurrection” (252, emphasis added). The emphases I have added point to the idea that all 
political action, an inseparable part of our existence, imparts new realities into the common 
world, as Arendt says, “whose end [we] can never foretell” (“Concept” 307). 
11
 See Ian H. Birchall’s “Neither Washington nor Moscow? The Rise and Fall of the 
Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire” for the character of the organization. Formed in 
February 1948 as an oppositional voice between the Washington-leaning French political 
leadership and the Moscow-leaning French communist party, the RDR “stressed the moral aspect 
of socialism,” and its dissolution predates Sartre’s support of Stalin’s USSR (365, 369). 
12
 See also Fraser pg. 82, which underscores Sartre’s and Camus’s influence across the Atlantic. 
13
 Brée explains that Camus criticized both “‘comfortable murder,’ that is, the violence of 
the intellectual who calls for blood while comfortably ensconced in his study; and what he called 






 It would be useful to note that, even in this essay, American critics are much more 
invested in answering the “postmodern” question than the French poststructuralists who 
exemplify postmodern counter-humanism. 
15
 See Schrift’s concise biography of Lyotard in Twentieth-Century French Philosophy, 
pg. 161-163. 
16
 See Paul Crowther’s “Les Immateriaux and the Postmodern Sublime,” A.T. Nuyen’s 
“Lyotard’s Postmodern Ethics and the Normative Question,” and Peter Murphy’s “Postmodern 
Perspectives and Justice.” The problem rests inherently in Lyotard’s writing, where he employs 
“metadiscourse,” “metanarrative,” and “grand narrative” as a constellation of terms without 
explicating their connections. This theoretical ambiguity leads Crowther, Nuyen, and Murphy 
either to conflate terms or construct hierarchies that contradict the other critics, leading to wholly 
different definitions and conclusions. 
17
 Subject in this sense is understood as the subject-object paradigm: the one who acts, 
speaks, or, specifically in Lyotard’s thought, “knows.” 
18
 Here, Lyotard rephrases Hegel’s philosophical maxim, “What is rational is actual; And 
what is actual is rational,” from Philosophy of Right without citation (10). 
19
 Davies explains, using Lyotard’s language and concepts, that Hegelian Idealism “seeks 
the totality and autonomy of knowledge, and stresses understanding rather than freedom as the 
key to human fulfilment and emancipation” (27). 
20
 A short caveat on Camus’s anti-rationalism: when Camus implicates modern logicality, 
he does not elevate pure irrationalism to take its place. Rather, he wants to show how the 
question of suicide and the world’s fundamental irrationality frustrates rational thought and 





irrational and meaninglessness (the Absurd). Although he wants to say his “reasoning developed 
in [Myth] leaves out altogether the most widespread spiritual attitude of our enlightened age: the 
one, based on the principle that all is reason, which aims to explain the world,” it seems to me 
the enlightenment assumptions about reason are exactly what he targets. See Myth 24-5, 31-2 for 
a further look into philosophical suicide and Srigley 39-42 for its connection to violence. Also 
see Duran, pg. 368-9, who perceives the parallels between Myth and Rebel as well. 
21
 According to Bowker, this passion “include[s] the imperative to decenter and disrupt 
subjectivities, the obsession with the ethical primacy and sanctity of the other, the valorization of 
loss, grief, and mourning as constituents of political life, and individuals’ and communities’ 
profound identifications with the status of victim” (xvi). The first two “postmodern imperatives” 
seem fairly commonsensical (though spun in an anti-postmodern fashion), but “valorization of 
loss” and “identifications with the status of victims” only make sense in his maladapted 
framework based on a fundamental misreading of absurdity. 
22
 See Invisible Man, pg. 16. For this discussion, the most important line reads, “I want 
you to overcome ‘em with yeses, undermine ‘em with grins, agree ‘em to death and 
destruction….” 
23
 See Johnson, pg. 303, 305, for the inextricable link between capitalism and slavery 
despite Marx’s claim that this “feudal” mode of production was “superseded” by capitalism. 
24
 Camus defines metaphysical rebellion as “the movement by which man protests against 
his condition and against the whole of creation” (Rebel 23). 
25
 See Pasco and Roberts. Most literary analyses take the monologic structure of the 





which only one voice is heard, [or] as a dialogue that may be the imaginary projection of one 
monomaniacal consciousness” (179). 
26
 See David Ellison, pg. 187-188. He untangles the jumbled events Clamence presents 
into a very intelligible and compartmentalized version of The Fall’s linear chronology. 
27
 In The Rebel, Camus defines terror as “an interminable subjectivity which is imposed 
on others as objectivity” (243), which Jean-Baptiste enacts when he imposes his portrait of guilt 
onto his listener, binding them in his guilt’s objectivity and universality. See Daniel Just’s “From 
Guilt to Shame: Albert Camus and Literature’s Ethical Response to Politics,” pg. 888-902, for a 
more in depth analysis of the connections between Clamence’s logic of guilt and terror as well as 
what Camus suggests as a more dialogic grounding for ethics. 
28
 In Catch-22, this logical structure operates on the assumption that “a concern for one’s 
own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a rational 
mind” (47). This proposition is almost impossible to refute, which gives this logical trap its 
power. 
29
 As in the above case, Clamence’s assumption that guilt is universal is hard to refute if 
we detach it from Camus’s existential implications and the extreme justifications it affords 
Clamence: we have all been guilty at one time or another, whether or not we lived with a bad 
conscience afterward. 
30
 In Postmodern Condition, Lyotard describes the narrative as being reliant on 
performative utterances, which subsume all other “language games”: “[The narrative] determines 
in a single stroke what one must say in order to be heard, what one must listen to in order to 






 See Apostolos Doxiadis’s “Narrative, Rhetoric, and the Origins of Logic,” pg. 77-78, 
96-97, where he argues that logic emerged out of narrative and mythic modes. 
32
 See Arendt’s “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” pg. 149-150, for the way 
totalitarianism blurs this binary in its systematized murder. 
33
 In the structure of a Catch-22, this reads, “If morale is low, then the officers are guilty 
for raising the number of missions / If they raised the number of missions, then Yossarian refuses 
to fly / If Yossarian refuses to fly, then the officers are not guilty for raising the number of 
missions.” Subsequent Catch-22s in this paragraph will be footnoted in this format for 
clarification. 
34
 “If Yossarian is innocent, he will not go home / If he does not go home, he is court-
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